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The unprecedented rate of economic activity in the European construction industry over the last quarter of a century has
played a major role in raising employment levels across most economies of the European Union. This development has
benefited large and small companies, as well as driven entrepreneurship, with self-employed people making up about
25% of the total labour force in the sector. As a result of the construction boom, the industry has witnessed a rapid spread
of the practice of subcontracting, encompassing increasingly long chains of interconnected companies. 
This scenario has redefined employment relations in the construction sector and, at the same time, reduced the direct
social responsibility of the ‘principal contractor’, as labour has been externalised by the use of subcontractors and
employment agencies. 
Such changes have raised questions over the impact of subcontracting on employment conditions in the sector, more
specifically in terms of: the legal implications of subcontracting for employers and workers; its impact on employee
rights; the increased potential for ‘social dumping’ and a potential avoidance of fiscal responsibilities.
Against a backdrop of increased European and national policy attention regarding this highly sensitive issue, Eurofound
set out to conduct a pioneering piece of research by analysing existing national legislation on liability in subcontracting
processes. 
Policy context
The steadily evolving integration and enlargement of the internal market, together with the free movement of capital,
goods, services and workers, has led to a greater movement of labour across countries. This has been particularly
noticeable at the lower ends of the subcontracting chains, where foreign companies and/or posted workers often operate.
In response to this outsourcing of tasks, and in an attempt to guarantee decent employment conditions and security for
workers, eight EU Member States have over the years introduced provisions relating to ultimate liability in the
subcontracting chain – that is, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. In four of
these countries – Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain – liability legislation applies particularly and exclusively to the
construction sector. In half of the countries, the Sectoral Social Partners have played a significant role in the law making
processes. 
At EU level, the European Commission has emphasised that employment conditions offered to posted workers must be
in line with the minimum conditions established by law or negotiated under generally applicable national collective
agreements. The issue of liability has also been addressed in a recent European Commission Communication on the
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (COM (2007) 0304 final
1
) and been the subject of
discussion in the context of the debates on modernising labour law and combating undeclared work. 
Key findings
Origins and aims of legislation
The research shows that legislation on liability in subcontracting processes in most of the countries dates back to the
1960s (Italy, the Netherlands) or 1970s (Belgium, Finland, France). Legislation was introduced at a later date in Spain
(1980), Austria (1990s) and Germany (1999–2000). The regulations were introduced in order to prevent the abuse of
employees’ rights and the evasion of the rules, as well as to combat undeclared work and illegal or unfair business
competition. 
Executive summary
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From this common background emerges the more indirect aim of securing social security schemes and tax payments,
along with safeguarding the public interest. Furthermore, in three of the eight Member States – Austria, France and Italy
– the rules were developed in a cross-border context, in order to prevent social dumping in the construction sector.
Nature of the liability
The study differentiates between two main types of liability: 
 joint and several liability – this only applies at one level of the employment relationship, that is, when a subcontractor
does not fulfil its obligations regarding payments, for example, to the Inland Revenue; in such instances, the
contractor, together with the subcontractor, can be held liable by the Inland Revenue for the entire debt of the
subcontractor; 
 chain liability – this applies not only in relation to the contracting party, but also to the whole chain. In this case, the
Inland Revenue may address all parties in the chain for the entire debt of a subcontractor.
Different variations of chain liability arrangements can be found in Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
Whereas, a purely contractual liability – restricted to the direct contracting party - is established in the regulations of five
countries and joint liability in three of them.
Coverage of liability
Coverage of the liability laws contains a material, personal and territorial scope for all of the Member States under
consideration. In relation to the material scope of the liability, three main categories of obligations covered by the
liability arrangements can be distinguished: minimum wages, social security contributions and tax on wages. The
research found that the liability schemes of all the Member States covered at least two of these categories of obligations.
Concerning the personal scope, a differentiation is made between the employer and the workers. In the case of the
former, the scope of the regulations varies greatly between the countries, while for the latter the scope of the liability is
similar across the Member States. Territorially, the main part of the rules examined apply throughout the country, which
in principle covers all parties established in other Member States when providing services in the country concerned. 
Preventive tools
All of the eight Member States, except Belgium, were found to have preventive tools in place which seek to diminish
the possibility of liability for the parties concerned. These may be divided into two categories: measures which aim to
check the general reliability of the subcontracting party and/or temporary work agency; and measures which seek to
guarantee the payment of wages, social security contributions and wage tax. 
Sanctions
Sanctions for parties who do not abide the liability rules fall under three main categories across the eight Member States:
back-payment obligations, fines and/or alternative additional penalties. 
Enforcement 
Similarly, all of the countries under consideration reported facing serious problems regarding the enforcement and
application of their liability arrangements on foreign subcontractors and/or temporary work agencies. Regarding liability
for wages, the main obstacles concerned problems with the language, non-transparent or inaccessible legislative
information, difficulties in proving abuses and problems in cross-border judicial proceedings. Concerning liability for
social security and taxes, the main problem cited was that foreign subcontractors and their foreign workers are most often
covered by the regulations in their country of origin instead of those of the host country. 
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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Role of social partners
In all but one of the countries examined, the national authorities play either a monitoring role and/or act as potential
claimants involved in the liability regimes at stake. The social partner organisations play multiple roles – for example,
acting as advisers, representatives and providers of legal aid to individual members, as well as being parties to Collective
Labour Agreements, or providing assistance with monitoring and compliance tasks alongside the local or regional
authorities.
Conclusions
The report underlines the significant differences that exist between the various national liability regulations in place in
the eight Member States under consideration. The varying legal tradition and industrial relations cultures in the countries
covered mean that research results are highly specific to each national situation and that few elements are transferable. 
Overall, the liability rules were deemed to be effective in achieving the specified objectives. Preventive tools offering
incentives to clients or principal contractors through the limitation of or exemption from liability were largely considered
a positive element of successful liability regulations. Likewise, developing simple, accessible and understandable norms
was identified as essential in the effective implementation of the regulations and in guaranteeing compliance. Moreover,
the regulations should not be altered, amended or modified too frequently to avoid confusion.
The involvement of the social partners in the development and implementation of the arrangements has proved to be a
salient feature of most of the measures categorised as ‘good practice’. One possible way to diminish abuses at the lower
ends of the subcontracting chain might be to further develop corporate or sector-based social responsibility initiatives.
These could easily be developed through the normal social partner channels of consultation and negotiation, thus leading
to largely binding agreements. 
The current study may serve to facilitate the exchange of experiences and good practice among Member States on the
subject of liability in subcontracting processes. At the same time, it may enable social partners and legislators to become
better informed in relation to an increasingly important policy debate.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
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Over the last 25 years, the European construction sector has seen a rapid spread of the practice of subcontracting, with
three main trends developing. The first trend concerns the concept of the ‘umbrella organisation’ – or ‘management
contracting’ – where core activities are developed within the company and all other activities are realised through
subcontracting. The second noticeable trend relates to companies that exclusively organise the sale of building works
and subcontract the whole building process. The third main trend concerns the subcontracting of bulk work, such as the
cleaning of a building site (see Hellsten, 2007, p. 36).
Furthermore, subcontracting chains in the construction industry are becoming increasingly long due to the structure of
the construction sector, which is characterised by a considerable number of large companies and a big proportion of
small and micro enterprises, with self-employed people making up about 25% of the total workforce (see Cremers,
2007). These one-person enterprises reflect the labour market tendencies: on the one hand, skilled workers recognise an
opportunity to use their skills and experience as an enterprise rather than an employee; on the other hand, some people
in the sector are working under questionable circumstances and for pay below that set by collective agreements – a
situation that can be considered as ‘bogus’ self-employment. A recent example of the latter was revealed by the Union
of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT) in the United Kingdom (UK), where a subcontracting company
employed a dozen Lithuanian workers. The workers were paid below the agreed minimum wage for the site, did not
receive payment for overtime and were charged excessive deductions for rent, tools and utility bills (see UCATT
press release
2
, 30 June 2008).
According to one researcher (Cremers, 2008):
‘The growing use of subcontracting for the labour intensive segments of the execution of construction projects does
not necessarily lead to a deterioration of the working conditions, but it certainly has created a decrease of the direct
social responsibility of the principal contractor. Labour has been “externalised” by the use of subcontractors and
agencies.’ 
Mainly in reaction to this outsourcing of tasks and corresponding employers’ obligations, eight Member States of the
European Union have introduced provisions relating to the ultimate liability in the subcontracting chain, which largely
apply to the construction and building industry. Indeed, some of these countries – Belgium, Finland, France, Italy and
the Netherlands – have had legal provisions in place for many years. Other countries – Austria, Germany and Spain –
have more recently developed legislation to address this issue. The different laws introduced in these Member States
reflect the different legal traditions of each country in the field of labour law and social policy and, as a result, introduce
very diverse instruments to deal with the situation in each national territory. 
The steadily evolving integration of the Member States’ economies in the internal market of capital, goods, services and
persons – together with the recent EU enlargements – have also led to the greater movement of workers across countries,
with the construction industry being particularly affected by this trend. It is at the lower ends of these subcontracting
chains, in particular, that foreign companies and/or posted workers are operating. The European Commission recently
emphasised in its press release
3
of 3 April 2008 the importance of ensuring that the employment conditions offered to
posted workers are in line with minimum conditions established by law or negotiated under generally applicable
collective agreements (see for example Cremers, 2007; Cremers and Donders, 2004, pp. 48–51). For instance, in one
Introduction
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case covered by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), the
Polish company ZRE Katowicz Ireland Construction Ltd had been contracted by a German enterprise to carry out
scaffolding work on a large contract which the German company had with the Irish power plant operator, the Electricity
Supply Board (ESB), for the €380 million refurbishment of its plant. When the German company discovered that ZRE
had not been complying with Irish employment law, it terminated its contract, forcing ZRE to dismiss 200 of it Polish
employees (Eurofound, 2007, pp. 11–13).
In this context, when gaps in the enforcement of national and Community law were becoming increasingly visible,
policymakers began to search for effective compliance tools. This also prompted a debate on the chain liability of
principal contractors in subcontracting chains. At European level, this debate has been launched by the European
Parliament and partly fuelled by the judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of Wolff and Müller
(C-60/03
4
). The liability issue was included by the European Commission (2007) in its Communication on the posting
of workers in the framework of the provision of services (COM (2007) 0304 final) and in its questionnaire on European
labour law in the Commission Green Paper ‘Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century’
(COM (2006) 708 final
5
).
Against the backdrop of the European and national political attention given to this highly sensitive issue, the regulations
on liability in subcontracting processes in the construction industry have been explored in the eight Member States under
study – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. This research report,
commissioned by Eurofound, is based on the material provided by the eight country reports and explains and compares
the national liability arrangements. In particular, it highlights the similarities and differences between the systems, as
well as the positive components, challenges and problems that they pose for the actors involved in the different Member
States. 
Methodology, aims and limitations of study
The material gathered for the eight country reports consists of a literature study analysing the regulations on joint and
several liability in force, along with the case law, policy statements and publications by social partners and policymakers;
it also examines the empirical research conducted on the practical relevance and effective impact of the laws, with
particular emphasis on the construction sector where relevant. For the empirical part of the study, the national experts
conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews with the relevant national authorities, social partners and other
professional bodies involved. The country reports served as the basis for the present comparative report.
The aim of the combined literature study and empirical research was to create a methodological overview of the existing
legislation and the way the laws are working in practice. The analysis sought to pinpoint best practice, shortcomings and
common denominators in order to facilitate policy debates at national and European level on the liability issue.  
For a proper interpretation of the present study and its results, it is important to acknowledge both its strengths and
limitations. Since it is the first time that comparative research on the theme of liability in the context of subcontracting
processes has been undertaken at European level, this study fills a knowledge gap. Thus, given the societal relevance of
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
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the issue addressed, the added value of this study for policymakers and for future research is clear. Furthermore, the
tripartite involvement and collaboration of social partners in each country and at European level in the construction
sector, as well as of national government representatives, guarantees that different perspectives on the research theme
are incorporated in all of the reports. 
However, certain limitations may also arise given the uniqueness and political sensitivity of the research theme, on the
one hand, and the fact that the research had to be conducted in a relatively short time frame and with a limited budget,
on the other hand. In this respect, it is important to note that the comparative and the national reports are predominantly
of an exploratory, descriptive and explanatory nature, and may only serve as an introductory overview in this context. It
should also be highlighted that the circumstances for research were not the same in each country. Firstly, differences
arose in relation to the ‘maturity’ and quantity of the regulations in force. Secondly, it proved to be more difficult in one
country, especially Italy, than in others to gain access to the most relevant stakeholders.  
Structure of report
This comparative report is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the subject of liability in subcontracting
processes, giving a brief account of the practice of subcontracting and joint liability, as well as the terminology used in
this highly technical area of law. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the national laws and actors involved in the eight Member States in respect
of liability arrangements and largely concerning wages, social security and financial matters. It also identifies the origin
of the legislation, objectives, coverage, types of tools (preventive measures or sanctions), and common features and
elements of the liability arrangements in the eight Member States. 
Chapter 3 examines the practical implementation of the liability arrangements and the effectiveness of the instruments
as regards the centre of responsibility for discharging employees’ entitlements and also in combating bogus
subcontracting practices. The focus is partly on cross-border subcontracting, as this trend affects the application of the
national instruments on liability in subcontracting chains. Here again, the similarities and differences are identified,
while the overall difficulties and best practices encountered in the application of the national liability arrangements are
assessed.
Finally, Chapter 4 makes some concluding remarks and gives an assessment of the recommendations and options for
policymakers and social partners, based on the findings reported in Chapters 2 and 3.
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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Key actors and terminology
Liability in subcontracting chains is a highly complex matter and encompasses many different actors. In terms of the
parties involved, the subcontracting chain usually features a ‘client’, ‘owner’ and ‘subcontractor’.
6
The subcontracting chain starts with the client, who is defined as: ‘any natural or legal person, public or private, who
orders and/or pays for the works that are the object of a contract’ (the term ‘customer’ is sometimes used but avoided in
this study). Often, the client will also be the ‘owner’. The latter term refers to ‘any natural or legal person, public or
private, who has for the time being, whether permanently or temporarily, legal title to the building or who is legally
responsible for its care and maintenance’. In this study, the use of the term ‘client’ is preferred and shall be taken to
include the term ‘owner’, except where the context would not permit this.
The client hires one or more ‘contractors’. A contractor may be defined as ‘any participant who agrees to carry out the
physical execution of the works that are the object of a contract’. If the client only engages the services of one contractor
to carry out all the work, then obviously no chain of subcontracting exists. However, the client may also employ the
services of a single contractor which is responsible for the entire building project but which, in turn, outsources part of
the work to other contractors. In this case, the first contractor is referred to as the ‘principal contractor’ (sometimes also
referred to as the ‘main contractor’), while the contractors hired by the principal contractor are known as the
‘subcontractors’. 
In their contractual relationship, the principal contractor and also the intermediary contractor in the chain are deemed the
‘recipient’ party, which orders and pays for the work or services.
7
Meanwhile, the subcontractor – which may also be an
intermediary contractor – is considered the ‘provider’, which carries out the work or services requested. Together, the
principal contractor and all the subcontractors may be labelled as a ‘subcontracting chain’. In relation to ambitious
building projects, the client may also attract several contractors for separate services. In such cases, multiple
subcontracting chains may exist next to each other. It is also possible that the client itself carries out, or could have
carried out, part of the physical execution of the works. In this instance, it may function in a double capacity as both the
client and principal contractor towards (some of) the subcontractors.
8
Apart from outsourcing work to specialised subcontractors – that may carry out the work themselves as self-employed
operators or through their own employees – contractors may also engage external labour to perform some of the work
to be done under their supervision. In the last decade, the practice of hiring workers from temporary work agencies has
only gradually become accepted in the construction industry – although considerable differences still arise between the
Liability in subcontracting chains
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The definitions of client, owner and contractor are drawn from the 1992 report by GAIPEC (Groupe des Associations
Interprofessionelles Europeénes de la Construction) on product liability in the construction industry, coordinated by the European
Construction Industry Federation (Fédération de l’Industrie Européenne de la Construction, FIEC).
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The recipient party may also be labelled the ‘order provider’, since this party gives the order to carry out the work. However, in
order to avoid confusion, this term is not used in this study.
8
This is the case in relation to the Dutch liability rules for social security contributions and wage tax. These rules do not apply to
the client, but a specific client is considered equivalent to a principal contractor: the so-called ‘self-constructor’ (see section on
coverage in Chapter 2).
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Member States in this respect. In this study, the parties that only offer the services of their workers to a contractor are
referred to as ‘temporary work agencies’ (the more general term ‘supplier’ may also be used but is avoided in this study).
The term ‘agency worker’ is used to refer to those employed by temporary work agencies, while the terms ‘hirer’ or ‘user
companies’ refer to the parties that hire the agency workers. Temporary work agencies may be functioning at the lowest
levels of the subcontracting chain.
A subcontracting chain constitutes a logistical chain, as well as a value chain of an economic and productive nature –
‘from conception to completion’. Single specialities or tasks are often ‘externalised’ to small companies or self-
employed workers. Over time, the subcontracting chains have tended to take the form of a multiple chain of production
– a chain which has both lengthened and broadened. Arising from this practice are construction activities consisting of
different parts of an overall project, executed by various contractors and subcontractors with problems arising in relation
to coordination and efficiency.
9
These activities are carried out simultaneously or in several, subsequent phases. The
chain can be seen as a hierarchical, socioeconomic dependency network or triangle, based on a linked series of contracts
and connections. 
At the top of this triangle, regular and completely legal undertakings exist. In the positive sense, the whole chain would
be based on, or could result in, healthy relationships between a main contractor and specialised, preferred subcontractors.
However, companies at a lower level in the value chain – with the exception of specialised subcontractors with highly
technical or other sophisticated activities – are not in a position to act on an equal footing with the main contractor. An
imbalance of power in the lower parts of the chain can lead to questionable contracts that define the market transactions
between the different levels (paragraph mainly extracted from Cremers, 2008). The problems at the lower ends of the
chain have led to the liability arrangements in the Member States examined. 
In the context of liability arrangements, relevant parties may include the ‘guarantor’, ‘debtor’ or ‘creditor’. A ‘guarantor’
is someone who is made liable for paying the debts of the subcontractor if the latter party defaults; in practice, this is
usually the principal contractor and/or client. A ‘debtor’ in the context of this study is someone who is in debt regarding
the obligation to pay wages, social security contributions and wage tax; in practice, this mostly concerns the
subcontractor, being the employer of the employees involved. If the debtor does not fulfil the said obligations in respect
of the ‘creditor’, it will therefore be indebted to this party – for instance, to the Inland Revenue, social security authorities
or employees. Thus, the creditor can be a person, company or institution to whom or which the money is owed.
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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This has led to Directives on health and safety at work – that is, Directive 92/57 (temporary and mobile sites) and Directive 92/58
(safety signs at work). Moreover, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (OSHA) has established the European Forum
for Safety in Construction in order to promote the exchange of experience between players in the sector and, in particular, among
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The Senior Labour Inspectors Committee (SLIC) has also devised awareness-raising
initiatives in the sector, including European inspection campaigns.
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Figure 1: Example of chains of contractors in subcontracting processes
Source: Adapted from Figure 1 of report by International Labour Organization (ILO, 2008, p. 21)
Joint and several liability
The concept of joint and several liability in subcontracting processes can be explained as follows. If, for example, a
subcontractor does not fulfil its obligations regarding wages in respect of the Inland Revenue, the contractor together
with the subcontractor can be held liable by the Inland Revenue authorities for the entire tax debt of the subcontractor.
Therefore, the creditor – in this case the Inland Revenue – can recover the whole indebtedness from either the contractor
(guarantor) or the subcontractor (debtor). The contractor is made liable for the total tax debt, regardless of its degree of
fault or responsibility. The guarantor (contractor) and debtor (subcontractor) are then left to sort out their respective
contributions between themselves. The logic behind this concept is that it should enable the creditor to address the party
with the best financial resources, which is usually a contractor higher up in the subcontracting chain – often the principal
contractor. Sometimes, the liability is not only of a joint and several nature, but also a ‘chain liability’. This means that
the joint and several liability applies not only to the contracting party, but also to the whole chain. In the example cited
here, this would mean that the Inland Revenue can address all parties in the chain, which are all jointly and severally
liable, for the entire debt. In other words, it could include not only the contractor but also, for instance, the principal
contractor (see also Chapter 2). 
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
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Liability regulations 
In all the Member States under consideration, most of the liability regulations are laid down in legislation. In Finland, it
is noteworthy that part of the legislation – more specifically, that concerning the payment of unacceptably low wages to
posted workers – is laid down in the country’s Penal Code. In some Member States – Finland, the Netherlands and Spain
– part of the relevant rules can be found in the countries’ generally applicable collective agreements. In Italy, along with
liability acts and decrees, a tripartite regulation concerning contribution payments in the construction sector exists; this
system has been established by three parties – the national public institute for pensions, the national public institute for
insurance against labour accidents and a private joint institute for holiday payments in construction.
It is also noteworthy that in some of the Member States – Austria, Belgium, Finland and Spain – social partners in the
construction sector have played a significant role in the lawmaking process and/or the particular legislation is based on
systems developed by the social partners. In the case of Austria, a new bill to this effect is expected to come into force
on 1 January 2009. 
In four of the Member States – Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain – liability legislation is in force particularly and
exclusively for the construction sector. In Belgium, the Liability Act on subcontracting is applicable to contractors
carrying out ‘certain work’, which mainly covers the construction industry. In Germany, liability provisions for tax
obligations are only applicable in the construction sector. In Italy, as mentioned, a tripartite regulation concerning
contribution payments exists in the construction sector. In Spain, more stringent rules exist regarding subcontracting in
the construction industry. Furthermore, in Austria, a bill which was recently put forward and which is set to tackle the
problem of bogus or ‘bubble’ companies will only apply in the construction sector. 
The liability arrangements of nearly all the Member States investigated include separate regulations for subcontracting
and temporary employment through temporary work agencies. In the four Member States Austria, Belgium, France and
Germany, these regulations on subcontracting and temporary employment are laid down in separate legislation; in the
case of Germany, a special liability regime for temporary employment regarding social security contributions exists. In
Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, these partly separate regulations are laid down in the same legislative act.
In Italy, the temporary work provisions are significantly more rigorous than the provisions regarding subcontracting.
Meanwhile, in France, along with separate legislation on bogus subcontracting and temporary employment, a special
liability regulation exists regarding undeclared or illegal work.
The liability arrangements of nearly all the Member States under consideration cover the payment of social security
contributions, wages and tax on wages. Sometimes, the liability is limited to certain percentages or amounts relating to
the contract concerned or to any outstanding debts (see section on ‘Coverage of liability’ in this chapter).
Origins and main objectives 
The legislation on liability in subcontracting processes dates back to the 1960s in the case of Italy and the Netherlands,
and to the 1970s in Belgium, Finland and France. The liability legislation was introduced at a later date in Spain (1980),
Austria (1990s) and Germany (1999–2002).  
Detailed review of relevant national laws
on joint and several liability 
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
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A considerable number of similarities were found between the Member States with regard to the background and
objectives of this legislation. Before examining these elements in more detail in each Member State, it is worth giving
a short overview of the background and objectives which are common to these eight countries. 
In all the Member States under consideration, the regulations were introduced mainly against a background of employers
evading their obligations and of employees’ rights being abused in subcontracting chains. In Austria, such regulations
were specifically introduced in a cross-border context, while in Germany the rules sought to combat illegal activity in
the building industry in particular. Therefore, the main objectives of the regulations in this context have been to prevent
abuse of employees’ rights and the evasion of the rules, as well as to combat undeclared work and illegal or unfair
business competition. Alongside this common objective is the more indirect aim of securing social security schemes and
tax payments – that is, collecting the relevant social and fiscal charges – or, in more general terms, of safeguarding the
public interest (see for instance the case of Belgium).
In the three Member States Austria, France and Italy, the regulations have been developed also or mainly – in the case
of Austria – in a cross-border context. In Austria, they have sought to prevent social dumping in the construction sector
with foreign companies and workers. In France and Italy, the central aim has been to fight the abuse of posted workers
by fraudulent employers in the context of cross-border subcontracting.
Despite certain similarities between the countries, the regulations have also arisen against the backdrop of the particular
circumstances prevailing in each Member State. In Austria, the introduction of the Anti-Abuse Act
(Antimissbrauchsgesetz) can be attributed to two factors. On the one hand, it is related to the situation in neighbouring
Germany in the early 1990s, when a construction boom occurred following the fall of the Berlin Wall: during this period,
social dumping with foreign companies and workers emerged as a significant problem in the construction sector; this, in
turn, led Austria to establish in 1995 legislation aimed at preventing similar instances of social dumping. At the same
time, Austria’s specific geographical situation can be considered an influential factor: the country had to cope with a
wide pay gap with the neighbouring countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. As a result, it was
attractive for companies from these countries – and indeed from all EU Member States – to work in Austria using their
own workers, who might partly be remunerated at the level of their country of origin.
10
This affected the level of wages
and the Austria’s labour market situation. 
In Belgium, the liability rules were established in the 1970s in response to the appearance of so-called ‘gangmasters’,
who declared workers to the social security and tax administration but never paid social security contributions and taxes
on wages. This legislation was based on a system developed by the social partners in the construction sector and has
undergone many changes since. Up until 1 January 2008, the liability rules were based on a registration system (which
still exists): under this system, a contractor could be registered if it met certain reliability requirements. Under the old
rules, principals and contractors that (sub)contracted with foreign partners not registered in Belgium had to withhold
15% of the sum payable for work carried out; non-compliance gave rise to a joint and several liability for the tax debts
of such contracting partners. However, this system was abandoned following a ruling by the ECJ of 9 November 2006,
which stated that this system violated the freedom to provide cross-border services within the EU as the obligatory nature
of the registration system could have a deterrent effect on foreign companies (Commission v. Belgium, C-433/04
11
). 
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In Finland in the 1970s, a liability clause was included in the national collective labour agreement (CLA) in the housing
construction sector. Nowadays, other important national CLAs in the construction industry also include such a clause.
Since May 2004, the country’s Penal Code defines the payment of unacceptably low wages to posted workers as a
criminal offence. In 2007, the Liability Act entered into force, which is based on the incomes policy agreement for the
period 2005–2007, concluded by the central social partners. A tripartite governmental committee prepared the details in
the system and the governmental bill reproduced it with only minor modifications.
In France, the first legal provisions – introduced in the mid 1970s – regarding liability in subcontracting processes sought
to protect subcontractors rather than their workers if the principal contractor became insolvent. In 1990, a system of joint
liability between a principal contractor and its subcontractor was introduced for the payment of wages and social security
contributions. This legislation must be seen in the context of efforts to combat bogus subcontracting and the abuse of
workers’ rights. It seeks to stabilise employment and adapt precarious forms of work. In 1979, specific liability rules for
temporary agency workers were introduced to enhance the protection of these workers. Subsequently, in 1992, liability
provisions regarding illegal or undeclared work were introduced due to the inadequacy of previous provisions for
combating undeclared work in the context of subcontracting chains. The rules provide an additional guarantee for the
payment of wages, social security contributions and taxes in the case of a fraudulent or disappearing contractor. Mention
should also be made of the French legislation regarding the cross-border posting of workers, based on EU
Directive 96/71/EC
12
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services; this legislation
was amended in 2005 for the benefit of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
In Germany, the liability regulations were introduced in the period 1999–2001, mainly against the background of
national and cross-border illegal activity in the construction industry – such as the fraudulent use of (sub)contracting
arrangements. The opportunity for such activities increased after the removal of the internal EU frontiers and with the
increasing permeability of its external borders. In 2001, the liability provisions for tax obligations in construction were
substantially changed. Along with the main objectives, stated above, the liability provision for minimum wages also aims
to protect German SMEs against unfair competition by subcontractors from ‘cheap wage countries’ and to combat
unemployment in the German labour market. 
Since 1960, Italian legislation has provided for a number of regulations regarding liability in subcontracting processes.
Since 2004, this legislation has been affected by many profound changes and the liability has been extended. The
background for the current legislation was the need to ensure greater protection for workers involved in subcontracting
and to safeguard fair competition. 
In the Netherlands, the legislation has provided for joint and several liability in subcontracting processes since 1960.
Initially, this was limited to social security contributions and only applicable to agency workers. However, since 1982,
the liability also embraces wage tax and applies to contracting for work. The main objectives of this legislation have
been to deter unreliable temporary work agencies and subcontractors and the abuse of legal persons, as well as to combat
unfair competition. Until 1998, the generally applicable CLA for the construction industry contained a real liability
provision. Since 2000, this provision has been a mere social clause. From 2007 onwards, the social clause obliges both
associated and non-associated employers (main contractors) to contract subcontractors only on the condition that they
apply the provisions of the CLA to their employees. The objective is to ensure greater compliance with correct wage
levels and other labour conditions, as stipulated in the CLA.
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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In Spain, the legislation on joint liability dates back to 1980. The general aims of such legislation are to protect workers
and ensure compliance with the regulations by all companies involved in the subcontracting process. A noteworthy
objective is that the law on subcontracting in the construction industry also aims to improve health and safety conditions
and to reduce accidents; at the same time, it seeks to promote the quality and solvency of companies and to introduce a
mechanism of transparency in work sites by limiting the amount of subcontracting to three links in the chain – although
it allows for some exceptions to this general rule, for example when specialised work is required, in the case of technical
complications, or in force majeure circumstances – and by increasing control of this chain. 
Coverage of liability 
In terms of the coverage of the Members States’ liability provisions, this can be further categorised according to: 1) the
obligations which fall within the liability, that is, the ‘material scope’; 2) the personal scope; and 3) the territorial scope. 
Material scope
The material scope – or employers’ obligations which are covered by the liability provisions – can be distinguished
according to three main categories: 
 (minimum) wages; 
 social security contributions;
 tax on wages. 
France, Germany, Italy
13
and Spain have liability legislation in place regarding all these obligations. Finland has
legislation that covers social security contributions and wage tax, while wages as well as holiday pay are covered by
CLAs. Furthermore, the liability regime of Finland’s Penal Code includes the payment of unacceptably low wages, or
those below the relevant generally binding collective agreement, to posted workers. In the Netherlands, legislation is in
place regarding social security contributions and wage tax, in addition to a generally applicable CLA for the construction
industry that applies to all material obligations deriving from the CLA, such as wages and paid holidays. In Belgium,
the liability regulations on subcontracting cover social security contributions, social fund payments and wage tax, while
the liability law on agency work covers social security contributions and wages, as well as all work-related benefits. In
Austria, the liability rules apply to social security contributions and wages. 
In some of the Member States, as already mentioned, the liability is limited to certain percentages or amounts relating
to the contract concerned or to any outstanding debts. In Belgium, for instance, regarding social debts, the liability
extends to 100% of the value of the work. However, the share devoted to social debts is limited to 65% when the liability
is also established for tax debts, the latter receiving 35%, excluding value-added tax (VAT). In Germany, one of the
conditions for joint and several liability regarding social security contributions is that the total value of building services
is above €500,000. In France, the liability regarding (bogus) subcontracting is limited to contracts for services worth
more than €3,000.  
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Personal scope
The personal scope of the liability regulations differs between countries and also frequently between regulations within
each country. Nevertheless, a considerable number of similarities are also evident, especially with regard to the
regulations on temporary agency work. In this section, the personal scope of regulations on subcontracting will first be
examined; this will be followed by an analysis of the personal scope of the rules on temporary agency work. For the
purposes of this analysis, the study will distinguish between the employers’ side and the workers’ side. Finally, some
specific conditions for the liability will be mentioned in the last part of this section.
Subcontracting 
Employers’ side
The liability provisions may apply to the principal contractor only or to all contractors that subcontract part of the work
or services. Furthermore, the liability may also or exclusively apply to the client.
Principal contractor only
In Austria, liability for wages under the Anti-Abuse Act applies only to the principal contractor, under certain
circumstances. The ‘principal contractor’ is defined as: ‘someone who passes within his business at least a part of a
service that he owes due to a contract to another company (subcontractor)’ (Article 7c, subparagraph 2 of the
Employment Contract Law Adaptation Act (Arbeitsvertragsrechts-Anpassungsgesetz, AVRAG)). In the Netherlands, the
social clause of the CLA for the construction industry – for wages and other obligations deriving from the CLA – only
applies to the principal contractor. In Spain, the liability for wages and social security contributions, as laid down in the
Workers’ Statute, covers the principal contractor, but only if the subcontracted work falls within the scope of the principal
contractor’s ‘own activity’ (see below). The liability also covers the developer if it is acting in the capacity of a
contractor. In Finland, the liability for wages as laid down in several CLAs applies only to principal contractors –
including user companies – bound by the collective agreement.
All contractors that subcontract part of the work/services
‘All contractors’ includes the principal contractor as well as (sub)contractors lower down in the chain (the degree of
liability of the contractor, either in terms of liability for the whole chain or only for the direct subcontractor, will be
discussed in the section on ‘Nature of liability’ in this chapter). At least part of the liability provisions in Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain apply to all contractors. The same is true for the liability legislation in the
Netherlands, as laid down in the country’s Wages and Salaries Tax and Social Security Contributions Act (Wet koppeling
met afwijkingsmogelijkheid, WKA14). 
In Belgium, the liability on wages and social security contributions under the country’s Liability Act applies to all
contractors carrying out certain work; this work mainly covers the construction sector. In Finland, the liability provisions
of the Liability Act apply to contractors in whose Finnish premises the subcontractor’s workers perform works that relate
to the contractor’s normal operations. In the building industry, the scope is broader: the provisions apply to all
contractors contracting out part of the work at a shared workplace. Therefore, in subcontracting a link to the contractor’s
normal operations is needed, while in building this link is not a prerequisite for the application of the act, which means
that all construction activities are covered. However, the liability provisions do not apply if the value of compensation
is less than €7,500. Finally, the provisions of the Penal Code apply to all (sub)contractors. 
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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In France, the liability regarding (bogus) subcontracting applies to all (sub)contractors. The liability concerning
undeclared or illegal work applies to the client together with the contractors, regarding the direct subcontracting
relationship all along the subcontracting chain. This means that the liability is contractual in nature. In Germany, the
liability for tax obligations in the construction sector applies to all contractors that subcontract part of the work or
services; the liability for minimum wages also applies to principal and other contractors in the subcontracting chain, but
with the exception of private individuals, building owners and administrative organs. In Spain, the liability for wages
and social security contributions, as laid down in the Law on subcontracting in the construction industry, covers all
contractors that subcontract part of the job to either companies or self-employed workers. The same is true for the
liability regarding wage tax under general tax law, but on condition that the subcontracted work falls within the principal
economic activity of the contractor (see below).   
Client
The liability provisions concerning subcontracting also include the client
15
in Finland and France. In Finland – in the
case of building activities – the liability provisions of the Liability Act and the Penal Code also apply to clients acting
as builders. In Germany, the liability for tax also applies to the client, except where it is the building owner. In Italy, the
liability for wages and social security contributions – in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 – applies to
the client with regard to the contractor and any subcontractors. In the Netherlands, the liability rules for social security
contributions and wage tax under the WKA do not apply to the client. However, a specific type of client is considered
equivalent to a principal contractor: the so-called ‘self-constructor’ (eigen-bouwer). A characteristic feature of the ‘self-
constructor’ is that the realisation of the subcontracted work belongs to its ordinary course of business, so that it could
have carried out the work itself. A ‘self-constructor’ is, for instance, a manufacturer that subcontracts a part of the
manufacturing process to another company. In this case, the manufacturer is considered to be both the client and the
principal contractor.
Workers’ side
In general, the liability regulations of the eight Member States under consideration cover all workers employed by the
subcontractor; this includes ‘flexible’ workers, such as those employed on fixed-term contracts or part-time workers.
Therefore, freelance workers and other workers who do not have an employment contract with the subcontractor are not
covered. Moreover, in Austria, employees in public services, that is, those who have a contract with the government, are
excluded from the scope of the Anti-Abuse Act.
Temporary employment 
Employers’ side
In all eight Member States, the liability regulations concerning temporary employment are applicable to the user
company and the temporary work agency. The user company – which hires workers from the temporary work agency –
is liable if the agency does not comply with certain obligations. In Finland, however, the Liability Act only applies to
user companies if the duration of temporary work exceeds a total of 10 days.
Workers’ side
In seven of the Member States, the liability regulations concerning temporary employment cover all the workers
employed by the temporary work agency. Only in Belgium is the scope of these regulations less broad: the Law on
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agency work covers all agency workers, except posted workers from abroad. In Austria, on the other hand, the scope is
broader than the general scope: the Law on agency work also covers ‘workers’ who are similar to employees and
‘workers’ who are not gainfully employed but economically dependent (arbeitnehmerähnlich). 
Specific conditions
In some of the Member States’ legislation, the extent of the liability depends on the place where the work is carried out
or the nature of the subcontracted work. In France, for example, the coverage of the liability provisions regarding
subcontracting may be extended or limited, depending on whether the work is performed at the workplace or site of the
principal contractor or client. In Spain, the liability on wages and social security contributions under the Workers’
Statute, along with the liability on wage tax under general tax law, only apply if the subcontracted work falls within the
scope of the ‘core business’ activities of the contractor. In Finland, the Liability Act applies to any temporary agency
work, whereas in subcontracting a link to the contractor’s normal operations is needed. However, such a link is not
required in the case of building works; therefore, all (subcontracted) construction activities are covered, unless subject
to specific derogations.
With regard to temporary employment, the German legislation is noteworthy. In this country, a liability regime for the
user company exists regarding social security contributions. However, in the building industry, the supply of agency
workers is only allowed by temporary work agencies that are subject to the same generally applicable framework
agreements and collective agreements on the social fund scheme as the hiring party for at least three years. For temporary
work agencies from other Member States of the European Economic Area (EEA
16
), it is sufficient if they predominantly
perform activities that are covered by the scope of this framework for at least three years. Thus, in the building industry,
temporary employment business is largely restricted to the so-called ‘colleague assistance’ (Kollegenhilfe) form.
Territorial scope
In all of the eight Member States under study, the liability regulations on subcontracting and temporary agency work
apply throughout the country. In principle, this means that the regulations also cover contractors and temporary work
agencies established in other Member States when providing services in the country concerned. However, the liability
rules only come into effect if the cross-border subcontractor has obligations concerning wages, social fund payments,
social security contributions and wage tax towards or on behalf of its posted workers in the Member State where it is
temporarily carrying out its work in the framework of the provision of services. Whether this is the case depends
primarily on the European and/or bilateral ‘conflict of law’ rules concerning the following: 
 labour law – Rome Convention 1980
17
and Directive 96/71/EC; 
 social security law – Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71
18
on the application of social security schemes to employed
persons and their families moving within the Community and/or, in the case of third country nationals, international
bilateral agreements;  
 tax law – bilateral treaties mainly based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
model tax convention.
19
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According to Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the EU posted workers directive, such workers are entitled to minimum wage
levels in the host country, as laid down by national law and/or generally applicable CLAs, provided that these provide
for more favourable wages than those owed on the basis of their employment contract. With regard to social security
contributions, posted workers will generally be covered by the benefit schemes in their country of origin for the first year
and, with the consent of the host country, also for the second year of posting. In terms of wage tax, depending on the
specific bilateral agreement at stake, it may depend on the length and nature (whether or not as an agency worker) of the
posting, whether the tax law of the host country applies from day one or only when the duration of the posting exceeds
183 days. 
In certain Member States, some specific rules and exceptions apply in the case of cross-border contracting with the
involvement of workers. In Austria, the Anti-Abuse Act has separate liability provisions for, on the one hand, EU
companies, including Austrian companies; these provisions are applicable to domestic and cross-border posted
employees within the EU. On the other hand, the Act also encompasses liability provisions that exclusively apply to non-
EU companies; these provisions are applicable to cross-border posted employees from outside the EU.
In France, the liability regarding temporary agency work also applies to foreign agencies when active in France.
However, these foreign agencies may be exonerated from certain obligations if they have already complied with
formalities of the same or of an equivalent effect in their country of origin. 
In Germany, the Law on the posting of workers (concerning minimum wages and leave fund contributions) provides for
the following: if foreign posted workers are not taxed in Germany, the provider – subcontractor or temporary work
agency – may apply for an exemption certificate. If the provider does not apply for an exemption certificate and the
recipient – principal contractor or user company – withholds the tax on compensation for construction work, the provider
can apply for a tax refund.
In Italy, all liability regulations also cover foreign contractors and agencies when active in Italy. Furthermore, they apply
to activities abroad pursuant to Italian jurisdiction. In the case of cross-border contracting, foreign Inland Revenue and
social security authorities can also demand payment by Italian clients of contributions and taxes owed in relation to
subcontracted work or services supplied in Italy by staff who have retained the right to pay taxes and contributions in
the country of origin. The same applies to the payment of taxes and contributions relating to subcontracted work and
services supplied abroad, when the posting abroad cannot be considered temporary or no bilateral agreements exist
between the foreign country and Italy.
In the Netherlands, the liability legislation on social security contributions and wage tax may also apply when the work
is carried out abroad by Dutch subcontractors. 
Nature of liability
Joint and several liability 
The concept of joint and several liability in subcontracting processes has already been explained in Chapter 1. 
The twin concepts ‘joint and several’ are defined in Italian legislation (Article 1292 of the Civil Code) as follows: ‘An
obligation is considered joint and several when each of a number of debtors involved in a single operation can be forced
to comply on behalf of all the others, and the compliance by one of the debtors frees the others from their obligation.’
In Italy, according to Legislative Decree No. 223/2006, the contractor is – in relation to the subcontractor – ‘jointly and
severally’ liable for wage tax and social security contributions relative to the employees of the subcontractor. 
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
18
According to the regulations of several Member States, the liability is not only of a joint and several nature, but is also
a chain liability. This means that the joint and several liability applies to the whole chain, instead of only the direct
contracting party.  
Chain liability (including joint and several liability)
Various types of chain liability, as described here, were found in the liability arrangements of Finland, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain.
In Finland, according to the Penal Code, the payment of unacceptably low wages to (posted) workers is a criminal
offence, which may lead to confiscation by the state of the illegal benefit gained by paying the illegally low wages. The
confiscation claim may also be directed against a (principal) contractor or user company. Confiscation cannot be ordered
if the (posted) workers concerned present their wage claims. This represents a kind of chain liability for the part of the
confiscation possibility, but not with regard to real wage claims.
In Germany, the liability provision for minimum wages contains an unconditional chain liability, that is, joint and several
liability; accordingly, the principal contractor, client, intermediary contractor or user company are jointly and severally
liable. In addition, regarding social security contributions, a  joint and several liability exists – under certain conditions;
the conditions are, for instance, that the transaction must aim to circumvent the law and that the total value of the
building services amount to €500,000 or over. If such conditions are fulfilled, the health insurers as collecting agencies
have the right to choose to claim on the client, principal contractor, intermediary contractor or user company (the
building owner is excluded); these parties are all jointly and severally liable.
In Italy, the liability for social security contributions, wage tax and wages (Legislative Decree No. 276/2003) is a chain
liability. The client or contractor is liable with regard to the contractor and any subcontractor(s). The subcontractor’s
employees can bring a direct action against the contractor and the client. However, concerning wage tax, the liability of
the client will be abolished in the near future under Legislative Decree No. 97/2008 of 3 June 2008.
In the Netherlands, the liability legislation under the WKA stipulates a joint and several liability for the user company,
as well as for the (principal) contractor, for the whole chain of temporary work agencies and/or subcontractors that
follow in line and that are working on the same project at the building site.
The Spanish Workers’ Statute contains a joint and several chain liability with regard to the principal contractor only for
social security contributions and wages; however, this liability only applies if the subcontracted work falls within the
scope of the principal’s ‘own activity’. Principal contractors in the construction sector are, on the other hand, subject to
an unconditional chain liability – that is, joint and several liability – regarding social security contributions and wages
under the Law on subcontracting in the construction industry. 
Contractual liability 
‘Contractual liability’ means that the liability is restricted to the direct contracting party and therefore to one level of
subcontracting. As a result, no chain liability arises. For instance, the principal contractor is liable only for its direct
contractor, and that contractor only for its direct subcontractor in turn. This kind of liability can be found in Austria
(Anti-Abuse Act); Finland (Liability Act), France (liability regarding (bogus) subcontracting and liability regarding
illegal or undeclared work) and Germany (liability provisions for tax obligations in construction). In Austria, this liability
is restricted to the highest level in the subcontracting chain – that is, to the principal contractor, according to the Anti-
Abuse Act (Article 7c.3 of AVRAG). Finally, the Belgian Liability Act of 2008 contains mainly a contractual liability;
nevertheless, under certain circumstances, this liability may acquire a joint nature.
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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Joint liability
In Belgium, the liability acquires a joint nature if the contracting party of the contractor with social security and tax debts
has failed to meet its obligations after being formally pressed for payment by the administration. Only if these conditions
are fulfilled will the next level in the chain be addressed. In France, the user company is jointly liable if the temporary
work agency defaults and its insurance proves insufficient to pay the wages and social security contributions. The
liability of the user company is proportional to the duration of the temporary employment contract. Regarding
undeclared or illegal work, under certain conditions, a joint liability of the client together with the contractors arises
regarding the direct subcontracting relationship. Finally, in Spain, the temporary employment provisions of the Workers’
Statute provide for a subsidiary liability of the user company, which becomes a joint liability if certain provisions have
been infringed.
Special types of liability 
According to the Belgian Law on agency work, a liability arises if the employment agency transfers part of its authority
to the user company. In this case, the employment contract of the agency worker with the agency will automatically be
transformed into an open-ended contract with the user company.
In Finland, the CLA in the housing construction sector includes a clause which stipulates that the principal contractor is
liable for the subcontractor’s or temporary work agency’s unpaid wages and holiday pay, under certain conditions. This
obligation is, however, ultimately a moral obligation. 
The CLA for the construction sector in the Netherlands does not contain a real liability, but only a social clause. This
places an obligation on the principal contractor to monitor the compliance of the CLA’s provisions in all individual
employment contracts covered by the agreement; the principal contractor is obliged to agree on this in the subcontracting
arrangement.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, in Austria, several types of liability can be found in one regulation. The Anti-Abuse
Act contains three types of liability: joint and several liability (Article 7a, subparagraph 2); ‘normal’ liability, which
means that the precondition for the liability is that the principal debtor received a warning but has still failed to pay
(Article 7c, subparagraph 2); and ‘secondary’ liability, which means that the contractor is only liable if the subcontractor
cannot pay the debt (Article 7c, subparagraph 3). Furthermore, the Law on agency work contains a normal liability
(Article 14, subparagraph 1) and a secondary liability (Article 14, subparagraph 2). The secondary liability exists if the
user company can prove that it has fulfilled its financial obligations deriving from the contract with the temporary work
agency.
Preventive measures used in framework of liability arrangement
As part of, or in connection with, the liability arrangements in the different Member States, several tools have been
developed to either prevent the possibility for liability among the relevant parties or to sanction the parties which did not
follow the rules. An overview of the different sanctions will be provided in the next section of this chapter. 
In terms of the preventive tools in place, these may be divided into two main categories: 
 measures seeking to check the general reliability of the subcontracting party; 
 measures aiming to guarantee the payment of wages, social security contributions and wage tax. 
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With regard to these preventive tools, three possible scenarios may occur in the eight Member States under
consideration: no preventive tools may exist; the preventive tools may be optional; or they may be obligatory preventive
tools. Moreover, when such measures are established, they may either be embedded in a self-regulatory framework or
in a legal framework. 
Before describing these measures, it is interesting to observe that, in Spain, a comparatively different preventive tool was
introduced in 2006. In this particular country, the monitoring and surveillance obligations of Law 32/2006 aim to restrict
the length of the subcontracting chain, with no more than three vertical levels allowed in the chain; some exceptions to
this limitation are, nevertheless, foreseen in situations where specialised work is required, where technical complications
arise or in force majeure circumstances. In addition, the certification of adequate training and organisation in the area of
occupational hazard prevention are prescribed by the measures. The certificates issued by the relevant Register of
Accredited Companies for this purpose are of special importance.
Checking reliability of subcontractor or temporary work agency
In five of the eight Member States – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands – no general obligation exists
for the client or the principal contractor to check the reliability of the subcontractor or temporary work agency. However,
in practice, not checking can result in a higher chance of liability and/or sometimes failure to do so is sanctioned with a
more strict liability regime. Private parties may therefore choose to voluntarily include a clause on reliability checks in
their contract as a safeguard against liability. The Italian national report, in particular, refers to regular use of this
possibility. Prior to entering into a contracting or subcontracting agreement with a contractor, the client must first verify
that the contractor and any subcontractor(s) it chooses have their affairs in order regarding the payment of wages, social
security contributions and taxes. Similar verifications may also be implemented during the execution of the contracting
or subcontracting agreement. 
Although not mentioned in most of the national reports, it may be safely assumed that the option to make such
contractual clauses exists in all of the Member States under consideration. In the Netherlands, optional tools have been
introduced by the legislator for the client and principal contractor to avoid becoming involved in the effects of joint and
several liability and thus having to sustain high economic costs. The fact that no general obligation to check the
reliability of the subcontractor exists in Germany is not very relevant, since the reliability check in this country is an
integral part of the obligation to take due care of the payment behaviour of the subcontractor with respect to minimum
wages, social security (optional) and tax debts (see next section). In Finland and France, legal obligations of a preventive
nature do exist. This report will describe the optional and obligatory measures next. As in some Member States the
possibilities or obligations to take preventive measures differ for contractors involved in public procurement and for
contractors involved in a purely private building project, attention will also be paid to measures in the context of public
procurement. 
Optional reliability check
In the Netherlands, before the user company decides to hire workers, or before the principal contractor decides to
contract the subcontractor, they may do the following: check the temporary work agency’s or (sub)contractor’s
references; request proof that these parties possess a (Dutch) payroll tax number; and request proof that the supplier or
(sub)contractor actually files a return. The incentive to do this is high because the liability clause will not apply if no-
one in the chain, including the employer of the workers involved, can be blamed for the tax and contribution debt. The
country’s Inland Revenue issues leaflets with guidance on how to screen the supplier or subcontractor and offers
possibilities to ask for declarations of good behaviour concerning payment of tax and social security contributions by
the relevant temporary work agency or subcontractor in the past. One recommendation of the Inland Revenue is to
include a clause in the contract with the supplier or subcontractor that they may not, in turn, outsource the work without
prior acceptance of the user company or principal contractor.
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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Obligatory reliability check
In Finland, a legal obligation exists to investigate and assess the reliability of the subcontractors and temporary work
agencies with regard to social security and fiscal law, as laid down in the Liability Act. In terms of conformity with the
labour law, the obligations of a client or subscriber are limited to gathering information on the collective agreement
applicable or, if such an agreement is exceptionally lacking, on the principal conditions of work. 
The French liability arrangement in the context of illegal work includes the provision that everyone, including
individuals and private companies, local authorities and the state, is under a legal obligation to verify that the other party
has accomplished all declaration formalities required in order to provide services as an independent contractor or to
employ others. Compliance with this obligation is required on the conclusion of a contract for services or a
subcontracting agreement worth a minimum of €3,000 and then periodically, every six months, until the end of the
contract. In other words, the client or principal contractor are legally bound to request and obtain proof from their
principal or (sub)contractor that its activities are regular with regard to the declaration provisions stipulated. 
Reliability checks regarding public contracts
In Austria, the principal contractor may check the reliability of the candidate subcontractor by looking at a special
register of subcontractors (the so-called Auftragnehmerkataster). The aim of this register is to make available for the
public authority and the contractors involved in public procurement information about the reliability of potential
contractors and subcontractors. 
In Germany, regarding the awarding of public contracts, the principal contractor has to prove its reliability. This
reliability requirement includes proof of the payment of social insurance contributions, tax charges and wages (see in
context of ECJ Ruling of 3 April 2008, case C-346/06, Rüffert vs Land
20
). Concerning wages, holiday and social funds
payments, the registration in the publicly accessible list of the association for the pre-qualification of building companies
(Verein für Präqualifizierung eV) can offer proof of this reliability. 
According to the Italian trade unions, in public contracting agreements, the so-called ‘5/6’ preventive measure may be
used; under this system, a proportion of the amount due on completion of the work remains unpaid until the
(sub)contractor has paid all wages and contributions due to or on behalf of its employees. In Italy’s construction industry,
the Single Insurance Contribution Payment Certificate (Documento Unico di Regolarità Contributiva, DURC), a
document proving the correct payment of social security and national insurance contributions, is obligatorily requested
for participation in all public contracting agreements. All contracting and subcontracting construction companies are
required to furnish a DURC prior to commencement of any work that is the purpose of a construction contract.
In the context of the French Law of 1975 establishing the joint liability of the client to protect subcontractors from
unreliable principal contractors
21
, the principal contractor must fulfil more stringent requirements (mainly of an
informational nature) if the client is a public authority than in relation to private clients. In addition, special rules apply
for public authorities with regard to the client’s liability in the context of the Law on illegal/undeclared work of 1992.
This liability applies when the public client has not taken appropriate measures – even though it has been informed by
the appropriate agents (labour inspectors), trade unions, professional associations or worker representatives that one or
more subcontractors are working on the site in violation of declaration formalities. Appropriate measures involve
inviting the principal contractor to ensure that the subcontractors’ activity becomes regular. The control agent will
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undertake a new enquiry in due time to ascertain that the client has required compliance. If this is not the case, the agent
will establish a written document (procès verbal) certifying the offence. On the basis of this document, creditors can
engage the joint liability of the client. Public authorities are therefore required to ensure that their contractors proceed to
the requisite declarations without delay. If they fail to do so, public authorities are freed from their contractual
obligations without having to pay compensation.
Measures seeking to guarantee payment
In Austria and Belgium, neither obligatory nor optional preventive measures apply regarding the guaranteeing of
payment of wages, social security contributions or fiscal charges. The following section will examine the rules in this
respect in the other six Member States under consideration.
Wages
Optional tools
In Italy and Spain, no legally established mechanism exists to enforce wage obligations. Nevertheless, the client may
request proof of payment by the contractor and any subcontractor(s) of all remuneration due to its employees. Another
measure may involve introducing a clause that enables the client to withdraw from a contract if the regulations regarding
wage obligations have not been respected. In Italy, the fulfilment of wage obligations deriving from the application of
the national CLA is ensured through the preventative measures implemented under the Construction Workers’ Fund
(Casse Edili
22
). The client may also apply to the Construction Workers’ Fund in order to ascertain whether a chosen
contractor and/or subcontractor have ever failed to fulfil wage obligations due to and on behalf of employees. In Spain,
the common practice is for the principal contractor to carry out regular and effective checks to ensure compliance with
legal obligations on the part of contractors and subcontractors – for example, by requesting copies of the relevant
payslips or bank transfer documents. 
Obligatory tools
In Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, obligatory measures have been established. In the Dutch and Finnish
collective agreements, relevant contractual provisions are stipulated. For instance, the Dutch CLA for the construction
industry stipulates that contractors may only contract subcontractors on condition that they apply the CLA provisions to
their employees. In Finland, the CLA for the housing construction industry states that every subcontracting agreement –
including those pertaining to temporary agency workers – must include a provision obliging the subcontractor (and
temporary work agency) to respect the sector’s national collective agreement regarding the terms and conditions of
employment. 
In Germany and France, the obligatory measures are laid down in law. When concluding the contract, the principal
contractor established in Germany regularly fulfils its duty to take due care, if it has a written confirmation from its
subcontractor to apply the conditions of employment and to require this also from potential subcontractors. However,
this written confirmation may not be interpreted as a sufficiently thorough check. The principal contractor has to make
further investigations if, during the contract, objective suspicion arises that its contractual partner or any of the
subcontractors are breaching their legal obligations.
23
In France, the client and/or principal contractor are also subject to
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a number of obligations in respect of the subcontractor’s workers. All contractors that employ workers for the execution
of a contract for services in France must provide, on the date of the contract and then every six months, a written
declaration, certifying that their workers receive a statement of written particulars (bulletin de paie) – including normal
conditions of work. However, in order to ascertain this, verifications should take place. In contrast to the controls on
domestic companies, these verifications require international cooperation between the equivalent authorities when
foreign contractors are involved.
Social security contributions 
Optional and indirect tools
Regarding private contracts, in Germany no direct legal obligations exist to prevent the non-payment of social security
contributions by subcontractors. Indirectly, the provision that the main contractor acts illegally if it has not at all, not
correctly or not completely fulfilled its obligations concerning social security contributions may be considered as a
preventive measure. Regarding the awarding of public contracts, the principal contractor has to submit, at the request of
the competent health insurance authority as a collecting agency of social security contributions, the names and addresses
of all its subcontractors. Moreover, the principal contractor is afforded a possibility to avoid the liability for social
security contributions by proving that it could assume without own fault on the basis of careful consideration that its
subcontractors have fulfilled their payment obligations. 
In Italy and the Netherlands, no legal obligation exists either. In Italy, the client may request proof of payment by the
contractor and any subcontractor(s) of all contributions due to the social security office. As far as social security
contributions are concerned, the client may also request proof of the DURC to verify payment of insurance contributions.
Indeed, in the construction industry, it is obligatory to show this certificate. Furthermore, the fulfilment of social security
obligations deriving from the application of the national CLA is ensured through the preventive measures implemented
by the Construction Workers’ Fund. The client may also apply to this fund to ascertain whether a chosen contractor
and/or subcontractor have ever failed to fulfil social security obligations due to and on behalf of employees. 
In the Netherlands, in order to limit the risk of liability for social security contributions, user companies or contractors
may use the following self-regulatory tools: screen the supplier or (sub)contractor; use a so-called guarantee account or
‘G-account’; or pay directly into an account of the Inland Revenue. Furthermore, the recipient/user company may choose
an accredited temporary work agency. User companies and contractors that use the G-account for the payment of social
security contributions are protected against liability for the portion paid, provided that they observe the rules pertaining
to G-account transfers. The same is largely true for direct transfers. The screening beforehand of the (sub)contractor or
supplier of staff and the choice of an accredited temporary work agency will obviously limit the risk of liability, but does
not legally limit or prevent the liability of the (principal) contractor or user company. 
In France, an optional tool exists in the context of agency work, where the user company may require from the temporary
work agency a certificate attesting payment of social security contributions. However, there is no incentive, such as
exoneration of the user company’s responsibility. This means the user company remains liable for social security
contributions if the temporary work agency defaults.
Obligatory tools
In France and Spain, the client or (principal) contractor (recipient party) is obliged to check its contractors regarding the
payment of social security contributions. In the framework of the French liability regime against illegal work, where the
subcontractor is French, periodical verifications include submission to the principal contractor of certificates attesting
payment of compulsory contributions to social security authorities and making compulsory declarations to the Inland
Revenue. Where the subcontractor is foreign or established abroad, verifications include submission by the subcontractor
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or independent contractor of a document citing the identification number which it has been assigned, in accordance with
Article 286 of the Revenue Code. If the foreign contractor is not under any legal obligation to have a revenue
identification number, it must provide a document mentioning its identity and address, as well as its temporary revenue
representative in France.
In Spain, the client or principal contractor must check the situation regarding any outstanding debts belonging to the
subcontracted company. To this end, the client or principal contractor must request a clearance certificate for the relevant
company from the Social Security General Treasury. This body has an obligation to issue the certificate within 30 days
of the request. Upon expiry of this 30-day period, the entrepreneur applying for the certificate is exempted from any
further liability in this regard. It is also common practice for the contractor or subcontractor to certify, on a monthly basis,
compliance with these obligations, by submitting documentary proof of payment of the social security contributions.
Wage tax 
Optional tools
In the Netherlands, legal obligations do not exist either for principal contractors and/or clients in order to prevent the
non-payment of fiscal charges by subcontractors. However, in order to limit the risk of liability for fiscal charges,
recipient or user companies or contractors may use the same self-regulatory tools as described under the previous section
on social security contributions, with the same effect of protection against liability or limitation of the risk of liability.
In Spain, liability for wage tax does not apply where the (sub)contractor provides the payer with a specific clearance
certificate stating that the contractor or subcontractor is up-to-date with tax payments; this statement is issued by the
relevant tax authorities during the 12 months preceding the payment of each invoice in respect of the contracted or
subcontracted activities. Liability is limited to the amounts paid without the contractor or subcontractor having provided
the said tax clearance certificate, or paid after expiry of the 12-month period covered by the previous tax clearance
certificate. 
Obligatory tools
In Germany, at the conclusion of the contract, the principal contractor regularly fulfils its duty to take due care if its
contracting partner has submitted a current exemption certificate issued by the competent Inland Revenue office. If an
exemption certificate has been submitted, the principal contractor is only liable if it could not trust in the legitimacy of
the exemption certificate, because it was obtained by unfair means or false statements and the contractor knew about this
or did not know about it due to gross negligence. If no certificate has been submitted, the client or principal contractor
(recipient of building services) should withhold 15% of the remuneration paid. The recipient has to ensure the careful
implementation of the withholding tax procedure. This legal settlement of the withholding tax procedure can be seen as
a preventive measure to avoid tax liabilities, as withholding the tax and transferring it to the Inland Revenue office by
the principal contractor avoids the non-payment of tax by the subcontractor. The principal contractor has no obligation
to check whether previous tax debts exist. It is only responsible for tax liabilities resulting from its order. The
withholding tax procedure does not cause a chain liability, because the recipient of the building services withholds tax
directly from the remuneration. 
Sanctions
Parties that do not abide by the rules regarding the liability arrangement in place may be sanctioned through a number
of means, namely: back-payment obligations, fines and/or alternative or additional penalties. This section distinguishes
between these three categories when describing the situation in the eight Member States. 
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Back-payment obligations
In Austria and Belgium, no back-payment obligations exist for the liable contractors and/or clients. However, in the latter
country, failing to meet the withholding obligation is sanctioned by a surcharge equal to the amount of withholding that
should have been made – in addition to the withholding itself. In Finland, back-payment obligations only exist in certain
collective agreements and are of a moral nature with regard to the principal contractor. Furthermore, it is interesting to
note that the so-called confiscation regime (penal law) applies if a worker has not presented their wage compensation
claims; in that case, forfeiture should be ordered. This provision may, in practice, have a real meaning when posted
workers have returned to their home country and do not want to present any wage claims. 
In the context of illegal and undeclared work in France, the client, principal contractor and contractor in France are
jointly liable for the payment of salaries and social contributions, when found guilty of having had deliberate recourse
directly or through another to undeclared work. In this instance, liability results directly from the court (guilty) decision
and is proportional – in other words, determined by taking into account the price of work or services carried out and the
remuneration applying to the relevant profession. In Germany, the principal contractor or the subcontractor that
forwarded building services to another subcontractor is liable for the minimum wages and for the back-payment or
payment of contributions to a joint institution of the social partners in addition to the employer. The worker may lodge
a direct claim regarding the minimum wages against the principal contractor or the client. Regarding leave contributions,
the Leave and Wage Equalisation Fund of the Building Industry (Urlaubskassenverfahren, ULAK) may launch litigation
proceedings against the liable contractors in the process of collecting outstanding claims. 
The client and/or principal contractor (recipient of the building service) is liable for delays in withholding tax, while the
principal contractor is liable for the social security contributions. Moreover, the latter is liable for delay surcharges and
interest for the deferment of payment. 
In Italy, the client is jointly and severally answerable for up to two years after the termination of the contracting or
subcontracting arrangement. According to one of the interviewees for this study, an obligation exists for the payment of
interest on delays to the Construction Workers’ Fund, in accordance with the provisions of the CLA. This obligation also
pertains to the payment of administrative sanctions and interest in respect of the additional provisions of the various
social security and national insurance authorities. In Spain, non-compliance with the obligations of Law 32/2006
produces joint liability for the subcontractor and its contractor in relation to labour law and social security obligations
in the event of the non-payment of wages during the term of the contract.
Finally, in the Netherlands, no real joint liability for wages is established in the CLA for the construction industry.
Moreover, no sanctions are stated in the case of non-compliance by the principal contractor. However, the employee of
the subcontractor may start judicial proceedings against the principal contractor, although it is uncertain if the claim
against the latter can be based on the provision in the CLA. In some situations, the principal contractor may be held liable
through tort law. 
Fines
Fines are not applied in Austria, Italy, the Netherlands or Spain.
In Belgium, a penalty for non-compliance with the liability regime is imposed in the form of a fine. This fine can be
imposed by the social security and tax administration but is very small compared with the amount that has to be paid as
a result of the withholding and liability. There is debate over whether this additional penalty is of a criminal nature. The
Finnish Liability Act establishes a system of negligence fees according to which the principal contractor or other
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shall be obliged to pay such a fee if the evidence obligation concerning certificates and accounts has been
neglected. The amount of the negligence fee is prescribed as being no less than €1,500 and no more than €15,000,
depending on the degree, type and extent of the negligence, and the value of the contract. Efforts to prevent or eliminate
the effect of the negligence may lower the fee, while repeated or systematic negligence may raise it. In the event of minor
negligence, the fee can be lower than the normal minimum, or the authorities may refrain from imposing the fee. The
fee is of an administrative nature and therefore payable to the state. 
In France, the offence of bogus subcontracting (marchandage) is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of
up to €30,000. The client or principal contractor having had recourse to trafficking through another is also punishable
by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of up to €12,000. Recourse to illegal or undeclared work is punishable by three
years’ imprisonment and a fine of €45,000. 
Alongside their liability for delays in withholding tax, the German client and/or principal contractor may be charged for
the endangerment of withholding tax with a fine of up to €25,000. This is an administrative offence, just as the
contraventions against the obligations regarding wages and social fund payments are in the Posted Workers’ Act
(Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz, AEntG25), which is punishable by fines of up to €500,000. The violation by the principal
contractor of the preventive obligation to give information concerning social security obligations may be sanctioned with
an administration fine of up to €50,000. In this provision, it is stated that the principal contractor has to submit, at the
request of the competent health insurance authority, the names and addresses of all its subcontractors. 
Additional or alternative penalties
In Austria, a provision exists in the public procurement law of the federal government (Bundesvergabegesetz) that a
company should be excluded from the procurement procedure, if provable severe offences are committed against labour
law or social security law. In Italy, failure to possess a DURC can result in exclusion from all future public tender calls. 
In Finland, the proceeds of crime must be forfeited to the state. Anyone benefiting from a criminal offence, such as work
discrimination or discrimination on the grounds of national origin for profiteering purposes, both due to illegally low
wages, may become subject to forfeiture (confiscation). 
In France, if a temporary work agency exercises this activity – without making the necessary declarations required by
law (having recourse to illegal or undeclared work) and/or without providing the formal guarantee for the payment of
salaries and social security contributions – then the courts may order the temporary closure of the agency for a period of
up to two months. In addition, where the guilty party is an individual, legal provisions allow for penalties, such as the
following: 
 a temporary ban for up to five years on exercising directly or through another the profession in the course of which
the recourse to illegal or undeclared work took place; 
 exclusion from public tendering for a period of up to five years; 
 confiscation of the material directly or indirectly used for the commission of the offence, on the occasion of it or
produced by it and belonging to the guilty party; 
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 publication of the court decision in newspapers designated by the court; 
 prohibition of political, civil or family rights. 
Where the guilty party is a foreigner, they can be subject to an expulsion sentence for up to five years. On top of these
criminal sanctions, when the administrative authority is informed of the existence of a written certificate attesting the
commission of the illegal work offence, it can refuse public subsidies for employment and training purposes for a period
of up to five years. Once the labour inspector has established a written document certifying the commission of the
offence, the client and/or principal contractor may be denied public subsidies, even though they have not committed the
offence directly but through another.
Mechanisms for workers to lodge complaints 
Judicial tools
In the case of the non-payment of wages during the term of the contract, in all of the Member States examined, with the
exception of Finland, workers are entitled to take legal action against their own employer and, depending on the liability
regime at stake, jointly against their corresponding contractor. The procedure to facilitate payment involves addressing
a formal request to the company first before starting a lawsuit. Trade unions in all of the Member States examined offer
legal aid and/or assistance to their members. The unions are sometimes entitled to start legal proceedings on behalf of
their members on the basis of their own capacity as parties to the CLA; in France, this is allowed unless workers
explicitly oppose the trade union’s initiative. In this capacity, they may be protecting their own interest in the
enforcement of the CLA, as seen in the case of the Netherlands. In Austria, alongside the trade unions, the Chamber of
Labour (Arbeiterkammer, AK) also gives legal protection to its members. Although nearly all employees in Austria’s
private sector are members of the AK, this is not the case with regard to employees who do not work regularly in Austria.
If an employee is not a member of the AK, the latter may give them legal protection only if this is in the interest of its
members – for example, to prevent social dumping. 
Posted and other foreign workers
With regard to posted workers, in all of the Member States, there is or should be a provision in the transposition of Article
6 of Directive 96/71/EC which makes it possible for a posted employee to sue, without prejudice to the right to institute
proceedings in another state. In Germany, a specific trade union exists for migrant workers: the European Migrant
Workers’ Association, Munich (Europäische Verein der Wanderarbeitnehmer, EVW); this association places a particular
focus on the needs and claims of posted workers. The main trade union in Germany’s construction sector, the Trade
Union for Building, Forestry, Agriculture and the Environment (Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt, IG BAU),
is also involved in supporting and informing posted workers and – in particular cases – does enforce the minimum
working conditions. 
In the French report, mention is made of specific workers’ rights regarding undeclared and illegal foreign workers under
the liability regime for illegal or undeclared work. Where foreign workers have not been declared and have no requisite
work permits, they are entitled to receive wages for the period they have provided irregular work, as well as to a lump
sum equivalent to one month’s salary if their contract has been terminated. Foreign workers’ rights with respect to
undeclared work provisions can be exercised by representative trade unions, without having to justify a formal
authorisation. 
Other tools
In Finland, under the Finnish Liability Act, any interested party may notify the safety and health districts of a suspicion
that the act has been breached, leading to an urgent treatment by the authorities. The liability schemes in the collective
agreements can be realised only through the dispute settlement activities of the social partners that are parties to the
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agreements. In addition to this, the chief shop steward of a construction company is entitled to obtain information on any
subcontracting agreement within the company. With regard to the housing construction CLA, social partners have agreed
that the trade unions have the right to supervise the compliance with the collective agreement for both domestic and
posted workers. The liability linked to the Penal Code (confiscation regime) is a matter for the public prosecutor. 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, workers may also lodge a complaint about unpaid or unacceptably low wages to the
labour inspectorate. In Spain, works councils are entitled to monitor ‘compliance with the labour, employment and social
security regulations in force as well as with the agreements, conditions and company practices in force’; to this end, they
can lodge complaints through appropriate legal channels ‘with the employer and the competent bodies or courts’.
Involvement of national authorities and social partners
In all of the Member States examined, with the exception of Austria, national authorities either play a monitoring role
and/or act as a potential claimant involved in the liability regimes at stake. The social partners play multiple roles – for
example, acting as advisers, representatives and providers of legal aid to individual members, as parties to a CLA, or
overseeing monitoring and compliance tasks alongside the local or national authorities. The traditions in the various
Member States are too diverse to make a distinction according to different categories. Therefore, the following section
gives an overview for each country (in alphabetical order).
In Austria, as the provisions at stake are of a private law nature, no competency exists for supervision or monitoring by
public bodies. Thus, it is solely the parties that are engaged in legal proceedings that are involved: that is, the employee
and their representatives (sometimes construction workers’ and woodworkers’ representative trade union, or in other
instances the AK or an advocate) on the one side; on the other side are the employer, the principal contractor and its
representatives (usually advocates, sometimes the Economic Chamber); finally, the judges constitute a third actor. The
social partners give information, advice and, sometimes, legal protection. The Federal Economic Chamber
(Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, WKO) offers its members (employers) advice and services pertaining to legal matters.
Legal protection is offered only in individual cases. Members of the WKO are nearly all companies established in
Austria. Companies not established in Austria cannot become members of the WKO.
In Belgium, the Federal Public Service Social Security (Federale Overheidsdienst Sociale Zekerheid/Service public
federal Sécurite sociale) and the Federal Public Service Finance (Federale Overheidsdienst Financiën/Service Public
Fédéral Finances) are responsible for recovering or collecting the payments resulting from the withholdings and for
invoking the liability. Under past legislation, the registration commission is an important federal instrument, comprising
representatives from the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue (Federale Overheidsdienst
Werkgelenheid, Arbeid en Sociaal Overleg/Service public fédéral Emploi, travail et concertation sociale), the Federal
Public Service Social Security and the Federal Public Service Finance. The social partners are also represented. Liability
regarding temporary agency workers is controlled by the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social
Dialogue and the Federal Public Service Social Security.
In Finland, the occupational safety and health authorities are entrusted with supervising the Liability Act, with the Great
Helsinki Region (Uusimaa) Safety and Health District having the supervision responsibility over the whole country.
Posted workers are also subject to supervision by the country’s Labour Inspectorate and even by the special investigation
unit of the National Bureau of Investigation of Finland’s central criminal police force.
In France, many of the authorities and institutions are involved in the liability arrangements. The application and
enforcement of the provisions related to illegal work are entrusted to the labour and maritime inspection authorities, to
police officers and to customs and social security agents, subject to the legal limitations of their respective powers.
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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Bilateral agreements may provide for the conditions of document and information exchange, with foreign agents
entrusted with the same duties in their respective countries. The social partners also have an important part to play in
preventing the offences related to illegal work and in implementing the other relevant legislation. Institutional
coordination on the issue of illegal work was, until recently, organised through the Interministerial Delegation for
Combating Illegal Work (Délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le travail illégal, DILTI). The latter organisation
had been assigned tasks such as compiling research and statistics, overseeing training for the control agents, as well as
administrative cooperation with equivalent EU authorities. However, in April 2008, DILTI was replaced by the National
Delegation for Combating Fraud (Délégation nationale de lutte contre la fraude, DNLF), which has equivalent
competencies that focus not only on the issue of illegal work but also on fraud in a broader context.  
In Germany, regarding the liability for minimum wages, holiday payment and social fund payments, only the parties
engaged in legal proceeding are involved, that is: the employee and their representatives (trade union or an advocate)
and the joint institutions of the social partners (the Leave Fund of the German Building Industry (Urlaubs- und
Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft, ULAK)) on the one side; the employer (subcontractor), the principal contractor
and its representatives (usually advocates) on the other side; and as a third actor, the labour courts. Thus, the only
institution that is involved in this context is the ULAK. Its function is to ensure that workers receive their holiday
entitlements, by raising contributions from the employers and granting benefits to employers and workers. The Inland
Revenue offices are responsible for the withholding tax procedure and have established certain key responsibilities for
the taxation of foreign building service providers. The collecting agencies of the competent health insurance authority
are in charge of applying the provisions on the main contractor liable for social security contributions. Health insurers
in Germany are corporations under public law that are organised on a regional or federal level.
In Italy, the public authorities most directly involved are the Inland Revenue and social security inspectorates – that is,
the Provincial Labour Office (Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro), the National Social Security Institute (Istituto
Nazionale Previdenza Sociale, INPS) and the National Insurance Institute for Industrial Accidents (Istituto Nazionale
per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro, INAIL). Also involved is the Construction Workers’ Fund, which
controls the correct allocation of payments benefiting construction workers, and, in public contracting arrangements, the
public supervisory authorities. In public contracting arrangements, both sides of industry are notified of the names of the
companies to which subcontracting agreements are awarded. This is not necessary in the private sector. Trade unions
have no official power to ensure implementation of the regulations in force, other than the contractual power deriving
from their institutional remit. 
In the Netherlands, the Inland Revenue is involved in the application and practical implementation of the rules in force.
Revenue pursues an active liability policy and is assisted in this task by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
(Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, SZW), according to the Ministry of Finance (Ministerie van
Financiën, FZ). Under Article 96 of the CLA for the country’s construction industry, no supervisory authorities are
involved. It is the responsibility of the employee involved and/or their representative trade union to start judicial
proceedings. 
In Spain, it is mainly the responsibility of the Labour and Social Security Inspectorate (Inspección de Trabajo y
Seguridad Social, ITSS) to identify labour law infringements – in other words, the surveillance function is fulfilled by
the public administration. Subsequently, the decision to apply a penalty is taken by the administration itself or by court
order. Complaints can be communicated to the social partners but the latter have no disciplinary powers. Through the
works council, the trade unions are entitled to monitor working conditions.
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Whereas Chapter 2 is primarily based on an analysis of the national regulations in place, the information for this chapter
derives mainly from interviews conducted with representatives of the relevant national authorities and social partners in
the eight countries under study. Such methodology is in line with the focus of this chapter, which is not on the aims,
nature and content of the rules themselves, but on the effective impact of the legislation in practice and its success, and/or
the problems which are encountered by the actors involved. 
In this respect, it is important that no misunderstandings arise from the use of terms such as ‘effectiveness’ and ‘effective
impact’ or ‘practical impact’. For this study, these terms refer to whether a specific liability regulation in operation
produces the intended result. In other words, the report examines whether the objectives of a regulation are fulfilled in
practice. An important indication for the effectiveness of a regulation is its level of compliance. However, the extent to
which a regulation is effective may only be estimated in an approximate manner, since – up until now – no standard,
quantifiable indicators exist in this field. When purely based on interviews, the assessment of the practical impact or
effectiveness of a regulation may inevitably involve some subjective elements. In the national reports, this problem was
tackled in two ways: firstly, the interviews were conducted among all of the most important stakeholders which represent
different and sometimes opposing views on the issue addressed – the government, employer organisations and trade
unions. Secondly, wherever possible, other sources of factual evidence were used and referred to, such as case law or
policy reports. 
This chapter first considers the practical impact and effectiveness of the national laws from a domestic perspective. It
then highlights positive issues and/or good practices. Since all of the country reports share a critical assessment of cross-
border subcontracting processes, the effectiveness of the national arrangements is examined separately from a cross-
border perspective. The chapter then focuses on two issues in turn, which arose in some of the national reports: the level
of awareness and the suitability of the rules for SMEs, and the use of soft law mechanisms. Finally, this chapter outlines
the most recent information about national developments in the near future concerning the liability arrangements at
stake.
Domestic impact of rules 
This section summarises the remarks in the national reports on the effectiveness of the systems. It first outlines the
liability arrangements and/or preventive measures and sanctions assessed mostly positively, followed by the more
ineffective ones; the section concludes with a summary of recently adopted measures which were judged more neutrally. 
Rather effective tools
With regard to the wage liability arrangements in the Finnish CLAs, the joint assessment of the social partners is that
they work reasonably well, and also have a prominent preventive effect. However, the conditioned liability in the
collective agreements for the economic activities of building engineering and earth and water construction is too new to
be assessed.
In Germany, the current regulation of liability for wage tax is based on an initiative of the three social partners in the
building sector: IG BAU, the Central Association of German Building Trades (Zentralverband des deutschen
Baugewerbes, ZDB) and the Employers’ Association of the construction industry (Hauptverband der Deutschen
Bauindustrie, HDB). The arrangement offers two methods to ensure the tax claim: the (sub)contractor should submit
either an exemption certificate or, if this is not possible, the recipient party (client or principal contractor) should
withhold tax to the amount of 15% of the remuneration and pay this to the Inland Revenue. An evaluation by the German
Federal Audit Office in 2003 showed that the cases where taxes are withheld were in a clear minority. The exemption
Practical relevance and effective impact
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route has become standard and covers in practice about 95% of all cases. Nevertheless, another report, written in 2007
on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Finance, suggested retaining the withholding tax procedure.
Regarding the German liability arrangement on wages, holidays and social fund payments in the AEntG, several cases
were pending at the time of writing, initiated by the ULAK, concerning holiday payments. The ULAK uses the legal
instrument of guarantor’s liability to a considerable extent. Frequently, the principal contractors pay the contributions or
back payments voluntarily after being informed of their debt as a guarantor. SOKA-BAU – that is, the ULAK and the
Supplementary Pension Fund of the Construction Sector (Zusatzversorgungskasse des Baugewerbes AG, ZVK) –
asserted that, in the period 2004–2007, debts amounted to a total of €18 million. The guarantors paid about €10 million
voluntarily, while legal cases were necessary to collect €7.5 million. Trade unions are also active in this regard. Between
2004 and 2007, EVW claimed minimum net wages amounting to about €1 million against appointing contractors. In the
same period, IG BAU secured €200,000; thus, overall €1.2 million has been paid out to mainly posted workers. All of
the interviewees deemed the chain liability regulation effective, although this does not imply that all stakeholders are
satisfied with the rules in place. 
In fact, the AEntG is the subject of continuous debates with sharply opposing views: the employer organisations ZDB
and HDB do not agree with the system, since they consider it unjust that the guarantor should face liability without any
blameworthy behaviour. They believe that the liability of the guarantor should depend on fault and negligence. In
contrast, the trade unions highlight the effectiveness and flexibility of the current liability arrangement exactly because
it is not limited to blameworthy guarantors alone. The social partners agree that a liability should prevail if construction
service contracts are appointed by public institutions. Moreover, IG BAU argues that a liability should exist for all
undertakings rather than only for those in the construction sector. In its view, at least all undertakings that sometimes
appoint building services should be liable.
The Italian verification measures concerning the reliability of contractors seem rather effective. The Inland Revenue and
social security office are authorised to implement specific controls and inspections in order to verify the compliance of
the contractor and any subcontractor. Should the outcome of these controls and inspections prove negative, the
institutions are authorised to proceed with certain sanctions following the serving of notice of the violations found during
the verification. Over the last few years, the number of verifications has significantly increased, leading to higher fiscal
and social security revenues.
For the Netherlands, the G-account or deposit system was assessed by all of the interviewees as a relatively effective
tool to prevent social security and tax debts with regard to subcontracting practices in the building industry. In particular,
the sanction of withdrawing the G-account or deposit of the (sub)contractor in case of abuse works as a deterrent. Clients
and contractors do not want to do business with (sub)contractors that do not possess a G-account or deposit because then
they lack the possibility of limiting their liability. However, this positive judgement does not include the area of
temporary agency work (see below).
Regarding Spain, in general terms, the existing laws provide an effective and adequate regulatory framework. However,
in practice, disputes may arise about the interpretation of such concepts as ‘own activity’ and the ‘workplace of the
principal entrepreneur’, or about the scope of the various obligations subsumed under joint liability. In general, when
reference is made to the ‘same’ or ‘own activity’, the ‘core business activities’ of the contractor are meant, according to
case law. 
In the opinion of one of the trade union organisations concerned – the National Federation of Construction, Wood and
Allied Workers, affiliated to the Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions (Federación Estatal de
Construcción, Madera y Afines de Comisiones Obreras, FECOMA-CC.OO) – when the general legislation on liability
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was drafted in 1980, the organisation of production was not as decentralised as it is today. According to the same source,
this explains the adoption of the concept of ‘own activity’. Furthermore, the term has generally been interpreted in a
narrow sense, as referring exclusively to the ‘core activities’ of the contractor. As subcontracting has become an
increasingly widespread form of work organisation, leading to the involvement of more companies which carry out
different activities from those of the principal contractor, the scope of liability has been significantly restricted since it
no longer affects certain subcontractors and this in turn has led to a curtailment of workers’ rights. Therefore, according
to the trade unions, joint liability should be extended to subcontracting companies that do not operate in the main field
of activity of the contractor. Furthermore, the trade unions emphasise that – although the existing regulations seem
adequate – the scope of liability should be broadened to include aspects concerning employment and job protection.
Another trade union demand is that the principal company should be more involved at a practical level in the entire
subcontracting process.
The employers note that, although joint liability concerns – where appropriate – the entire subcontracting process, in
practice responsibility falls on the company most capable of assuming it – in other words, the largest companies in the
subcontracting chain.
Ineffective or less effective tools
According to the persons interviewed in Austria, the least effective liability provision concerns liability in subcontracting
processes for wages applying to EU-based and domestic contractors. At best, this provision could still have a modest
general preventive effect. General prevention means that the principal contractor pays attention to which subcontractor
they award the contract. The specific reasons why this norm is not effective are the following. The provision states in its
fifth subparagraph that the liability is not applicable if the subcontractor is insolvent. Regarding the nature of the liability,
which is only a secondary liability (see previous chapter), this means that even in theory the liability will hardly ever be
applicable. Thus, if the principal debtor cannot pay the debt, they are almost always insolvent. Furthermore, according
to the dominant interpretation, the liability arrangement is restricted to the highest level of the chain. 
Regarding the Austrian liability arrangement concerning temporary work agencies, the situation is similar. This liability
is not applicable if the temporary work agency is insolvent and the employee may claim the outstanding remuneration
and other demands – usually the wage – from the fund relating to the protection of employees in the event of the
insolvency of their employer (Insolvenzausfallgeldfonds). 
Furthermore, the liability is only a secondary liability if the user company has demonstrably fulfilled its financial
obligations deriving from the contract between the temporary work agency and the user company. This means, even in
theory, that the liability will hardly ever be applicable from the moment that the user company has paid its financial
obligations. Because the employee almost never knows in advance whether the user company has paid its financial
obligations stemming from the contract between the temporary work agency and user company, a high risk arises that
the employee could lose the court proceedings. 
For France, the interviewees questioned the effectiveness of the liability arrangement concerning illegal work. The
principal weakness of the provision is that it is rather narrow in scope. In effect, joint liability for the absence of
necessary verifications is limited to those contractors directly connected to the client. As a result, without having been
subject to criminal sanctions, the client has no liability for those subcontractors contracted by the principal contractor or
for any further subcontractors in the chain. This weakness has been highlighted not only by the trade unions but also by
the senate during its examination of an information report in 2006 on the French construction sector. 
However, the French Building Federation (Fédération Française du Bâtiment, FFB) considers the current responsibility
system satisfactory in the context of domestic subcontracting, provided that liability remains limited to direct contractors
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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as well as subsidiary ones. According to the National Federation of Public Works (Fédération Nationale des Travaux
Publics, FNTP), the advantage of the current system is that it guarantees a certain degree of security. In effect, once
verifications take place, no further concern arises that the employer’s liability will be engaged. 
The General Confederation of Labour (Confédération générale du travail, CGT) argues instead that employers should
be placed under a legal obligation to verify the effective cost of the work or services, including materials and workforce,
and that the client should be automatically liable for the payment of salaries, tax and social security contributions. By
contrast, according to the spokesperson of the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (Confédération française
démocratique du travail, CFDT), this trade union organisation does not favour the limitation of recourse to
subcontracting to one level. CFDT would claim equality of treatment, including wages and working hours, between the
subcontractors’ workers and those of the main contractor; the confederation recognises that businesses may need to
externalise part of their activity.
In Germany, the liability concerning social security contributions, which was introduced in mid 2002, had resulted in
only eight imposed fines by 1 August 2004. The total sum of the fines amounted to about €13,000 a year. One of these
administrative orders imposing a fine of over €2,000 was legally enforced. Apart from these modest results, the liability
causes considerable administrative overheads. A measurement of bureaucratic costs in 2007 revealed that the liability for
social security contributions burdens construction companies with costs totalling more than €11 million a year.
Therefore, the gains and burdens of this liability arrangement are disproportionate towards each other.
Although the social partners share the view that this liability arrangement should be urgently changed, they propose
different solutions. Highlighting the heavy administrative burden, the employer organisations argue that the contested
regulation should be abolished. Subcontractors in particular emphasise the substantial administrative effort to obtain
certificates of good payment behaviour from the health insurers. Such effort is due to the fact that the subcontractor has
to request these certificates every three months for each of its workers at the different health insurance agencies where
at least one of the workers is insured. The responsible health insurance agencies may change frequently, as it is common
for workers to change their health insurance to avail of cheaper or better insurance conditions.
Trade unions contend that the most important reasons for the ineffective regulation are competition between the
collecting agencies and the limitation of the liability to building contracts with a value of more than €500,000. A further
reason is the limitation of the liability to the immediate subcontractor, which could facilitate its evasion, for example by
splitting the construction contract. In the context of their analysis, the trade unions advocate a revised liability regime
similar to the wage liability regulation. Moreover, they recommend a transfer of the role of enforcement and monitoring
to one collecting agency, the German Pension Insurance (Deutsche Rentenversicherung), which does not compete
against other institutions.
The German government recapitulated to the parliament the statements of the collecting agencies and they agreed that
the liability as a matter of principle has positive effects. Nevertheless, they articulated substantive practical problems,
recognising the considerable administrative effort of applying for certificates of good payment behaviour.  
For Italy, so far the greatest difficulties encountered in implementing the system of joint and several liability have been
the result of the continuous transformation and amendment of the regulations in force. This state of flux has frequently
left the inspectorate authorities nonplussed and ill-prepared. 
Furthermore, the labour inspectorate often finds it difficult to obtain the employee registers of less diligent employers –
documents which are fundamental to its verifications. Thus, it can be difficult to prove the failure of a contractor or
subcontractor to comply with social security or tax obligations, particularly when such failure is only partial and the
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employees do not intend to file legal action. Another problem is that the municipal police are generally reluctant to
control the way in which works are completed in the territory of their municipal authorities of reference. Although
private contracting agreements are also inspected by INPS, INAIL and the labour inspectorates, more direct controls by
the municipal police would undoubtedly be more effective and immediate.
The Italian trade unions believe that it is necessary to implement the existing regulations, many of which still have to be
fully enacted. They also believe that the means of disciplining the private sector should be strengthened, and that the law
should ensure that not only the client or contracting company is responsible for the regularity of fulfilling wage and
social security obligations – as currently established in the recent regulations on joint and several liability. At present,
the commitment of those companies which conscientiously verify the fulfilment of social security and wage obligations
by their subcontractors is not sufficiently rewarded, due to the inefficiency of the current control procedures.
With regard to temporary work agencies, the effectiveness of the Dutch G-account or deposit system to prevent social
security and tax debts is assessed as being considerably less effective than its counterpart for subcontractors: the Ministry
of Finance, acting as the Directorate for Taxes, calculates that, in the field of temporary agency work, about €150 to €160
million in wage tax is left unpaid on an annual basis. Furthermore, the ministry estimates that about two thirds of the
temporary work agencies which operate in the Netherlands are fraudulent. Therefore, the certification of these agencies
with a quality mark known as NEN-norm 4400, granted by the National Standardisation Institute (Nederlands centrum
van normalisatie, NEN) and established by the agencies themselves, is important. The trade unions and employer
organisations of the temporary work agencies have urged the government to require this certification by law, and this
strategy is currently being proposed by members of the Lower House of the Dutch national parliament (Tweede Kamer
der Staten-Generaal). 
Recently adopted measures
In Belgium, under the previous system of registration, a withholding obligation and joint liability seem to have
successfully contributed to reducing fraud in the construction sector. Although doubts exist as to whether the liability
factor can be singled out as the greatest deterrent against gangmasters, in the context of domestic subcontracting
practices the implemented norms and instruments were seen as effective. It is difficult to evaluate the new, recently
adopted, legislation but social partners from both sides have expressed concern that it will be more difficult to establish
the liability and to generate income. 
The two ministries involved in the application of the old and new liability regulations disagree on their respective
capabilities to effectively enforce the law. The Federal Public Service Finance believes that it has greater opportunity to
obtain the payments resulting from the withholding obligation, so situations where they would have to invoke liability
will be rare. This opinion is contested by the Federal Public Service Social Security and indeed no legal basis supports
it; the latter concedes only that the Federal Public Service Finance has more possibilities for acting against contractors
before they go bankrupt. Since no databank has been set up yet, the Federal Public Service Finance cannot invoke
liability under the new legislation. Unlike the Federal Public Service Social Security, the Federal Public Service Finance
has hardly any people working exclusively on this legislation.
The trade unions fear that, under the new legislation, employers will no longer have an incentive to be registered. They
regret that there is no longer any correlation with the registration commission. Employer organisations share this view.
One employer organisation is in favour of attributing more importance to the registration system, but without returning
to the old legislation. Although the trade unions admit that the old legislation was too complicated, they are not satisfied
with the new rules. Firstly, they want the liability arrangement to be applied to the entire subcontracting chain. Secondly,
together with one employer organisation, they urge the government to set up a tax databank and emphasise the need for
the labour inspectorate to carry out more checks. Nowadays, it is difficult to know whether a company is using fraudulent
subcontracting arrangements or, for instance, bogus self-employed workers.
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It is also too early to give any final evaluation on the effect of the Finnish Liability Act. However, the act is of limited
effect while it does not include a back-payment obligation of the principal contractor or other subscriber concerning
wages, taxes and social security premiums. According to a report of the regional labour inspection authority (Uusimaa
Safety and Health District), which is coordinating the inspection throughout the country since February 2008, a number
of defects arise with regard to compliance with the Liability Act. During 2007, a total of 1,611 subcontracting contracts
– including those on temporary agency work – were checked: 796 or about a half of them came under the evidence
obligation of the principal contractor or subscriber, given the derogations in Section 5, Paragraphs 1 to 5. Of these 796
contracts, defects were found in relation to the following: the account of entering tax registers in 127 cases (16%), the
trade register extract in 335 cases (42%), the tax account in 194 cases (24%), the pension premiums account in 225 cases
(28.3%) and the applicable collective agreement in 393 cases (49%). Practical orders were given in 431 cases. However,
given the recent enactment of the law, only 47 negligence fees were charged to 33 different principal contractors or
subscribers, totalling €124,300. 
In this context, the Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries (Rakennusteollisuus, RT) emphasises the need to
focus the supervision on potentially abusive activities instead of an overly strict scrutiny of every single document. To
this end, RT is in discussions with the Uusimaa Safety and Health District.
Regarding Spain, it is too early to evaluate the implementation of Law 32/2006 on regulating subcontracting in the
construction sector, as it has only recently been enacted and come into force. In general, this law is expected to be
effective, both because it is backed by all social partners and because, given that it applies to the sector as a whole, it
has the force of law. Moreover, the Royal Decree 1109/2007 provides for a review of the law’s provisions within three
years of the decree coming into force. Furthermore, the implementation of Law 32/2006 – following the enactment of
the relevant implementing regulations and the creation of a Register of Accredited Companies – should enable a higher
degree of specialisation of companies, more investment in new technologies and a better-qualified workforce. It was also
noted that this form of organisation facilitates the participation of SMEs in the sector, and this in turn will contribute to
job creation. 
Positive assessments and practices  
As became clear when examining the views of the actors on the effectiveness of the rules in place, effective tools are not
necessarily supported by all of the stakeholders. A reason for this paradox may be that most employers are in principle
not in favour of the chain liability instrument because it burdens them with responsibilities which, from their perspective,
should be left within the domain of public authorities. Therefore, they often tend to view liability arrangements at best
as a ‘necessary evil’. In this respect, the historical background of the Belgian liability arrangement is interesting: the
former regulation came into force after the Federal Public Service Finance had proposed imposing a ban on
subcontracting. This proposal was a result of a scandal in which a subcontracting company employing 1,000 workers did
not pay social security contributions and tax on their wages. In response to the proposal, the social partners developed
an alternative system, including a liability arrangement.  
Nevertheless, the national reports outline a series of positive practices, as mutually identified by both sets of social
partners. In general, a positive practice may be defined as a technique, method or process which is effective at delivering
a particular outcome. In the context of this study, the term ‘positive practice’ is reserved for those liability arrangements
or elements of them which were assessed positively by both the trade unions and the employers. In addition, certain
liability arrangements were assessed as positive by only one of the social partners, while their counterpart did not share
this opinion. This section focus on practices whose effectiveness is agreed by both of the social partners; it also includes
measures considered positive by more than one stakeholder, for example, either the trade unions and the government, or
the employer organisations and the government.
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In Belgium, the social partners mentioned the following elements of the liability arrangement that may be identified and
promoted as good practice:
 the legislation makes it possible to impose withholdings and invoke liability;
 the employer organisations and trade unions are involved in the registration commission and thus, indirectly, in the
application of the liability arrangement – under the old legislation.
Regarding Finland, the Confederation of Finnish Industries (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto, EK), which also represents
SMEs, is satisfied with the Liability Act, emphasising how the act puts in practice the principle that no pecuniary back-
payment liability arises for the principal contractors and other subscribers. The Federation of Finnish Enterprises
(Suomen Yrittäjät), which mainly represents SMEs, was involved in the state committee that drafted the unanimous
proposal for the Liability Act and has not subsequently expressed any critical view on the legislation. The act has raised
awareness of the risks associated with subcontracting and temporary agency work, and helps in combating the illegal
economy. Therefore, trade unions also consider the act as a workable compromise, although they regret the absence of
a monetary liability of the principal contractors and clients –this provision remains a long-term trade union aim. In the
unions’ view, a salient deficit in the current legal structure is the lack of responsibility throughout a subcontracting chain. 
In a joint assessment, the Finnish social partners consider the provisions in the CLA for the housing construction sector
as good practice since these measures have shown their worth for decades. The Construction Trade Union highlights the
possibilities offered by the collective agreements to tackle the non-payment of adequate wages by subcontractors and
temporary work agencies.
In Germany, all of the stakeholders expressed their satisfaction with the fiscal liability regime outlined earlier.
All interviewees in Italy agreed that, with regard to the management of the labour market, it is important that both sides
of labour are involved in developing and implementing measures to replace the many existing provisions which are now
of little use. The DURC, which was developed by the social partners during the negotiation of the CLA for the
construction sector prior to being received into legislation, is a good example of best practice. In 2007 alone, it enabled
the regularisation of over 160,000 workers. It is nevertheless a measure that still needs to be perfected, although the
introduction of a so-called congruity index will facilitate identification of the correct fulfilment of wage obligations; this
index verifies the congruity of the incidence of the labour supplied to the workplace during the work. However, the trade
unions consider that it is time to move on from the question of whether an obligation has been fulfilled to the issue of
how much has been paid. The unions would favour the extension of the obligatory DURC to the private sector. 
With regard to the Netherlands, in general all relevant stakeholders are satisfied with the current liability arrangement
for social security contributions and wage tax as far as domestic situations are concerned, apart from the situation with
regard to temporary work agencies. Despite the general agreement that the current G-account works well, the Ministry
of Finance is preparing a modification of it aiming to replace this system in the Netherlands.
For Spain, all respondents highlighted as a positive development the fact that labour legislation in general and Law
32/2006 in particular have been largely developed through social dialogue between the employer organisations and trade
unions. Law 32/2006 embodies a commitment to sectoral collective bargaining at national level.
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Impact of rules in cross-border subcontracting practices  
From all of the national reports, the picture emerges that the liability rules in the eight Member States under study largely
fail to have an effective impact on fraudulent situations and abuses of posted workers in cross-border situations of
subcontracting and temporary agency work. In fact, the much contested German liability arrangement on wages, holiday
and social fund payments may be the only exception in this respect (see above). According to IG BAU, since this liability
arrangement was implemented, large companies and their organisations are much more interested in information
regarding the provisions of the law in place and the possibilities of urging their subcontractors to observe this law.  
This section outlines the problems mentioned in the national reports concerning liability in relation to cross-border
subcontractors, followed by a few suggestions from the people interviewed regarding possible solutions. A distinction is
made between problems connected to the specific socioeconomic and societal position of the posted worker, issues
related to the legal context and difficulties with regard to enforcement of the rules.
Position of posted worker
The Austrian and French country reports in particular emphasise the precarious socioeconomic and/or societal position
of many posted construction workers in the framework of subcontracting processes.
26
In the Austrian report, the
theoretical possibility is given that posted workers from outside the EU – known as third-country nationals – may have
to prove, in the framework of the wage liability regulation in place, that the principal contractor passed on the contract
to another party, despite the fact that such subcontracting was not allowed. Furthermore, the report observes that the
practical obstacles to initiating legal action for illegally posted workers in Austria from a country outside the EU are
high. 
Since 2002, an EU-cofinanced project exists between Austria and Hungary. The project aims to improve cross-border
cooperation between the trade unions in the two Member States. One part of this project included legal advice in
Hungarian for employees from Hungary – at that time not yet an EU Member State – who were working in Austria. The
demands for this legal advice increased greatly in the period from March 2004 to October 2005: almost 4,000 Hungarian
employees sought advice. It became evident that employers did not apply the same employment conditions and wages
as specified by the law to these employees. Regrettably, it also became clear that one effect of the legal advice was that
employers aimed to recruit less well-informed employees.
Even if a posted worker were to try to pursue their demands and could manage the challenges of language, information
about the legal situation and the problem of a cross-border judicial proceeding, they would still not be armed against
questionable practices of the employer, such as deducting costs for accommodation and food supply from wages.
Unfortunately, it is not sufficiently clear whether it is legally permitted in Austria to make such deductions. The Austrian
interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 7, subparagraph 2 of the EU posted workers directive is that allowances specific
to the posting that are paid in reimbursement of expenditure actually incurred on account of the posting are not part of
the minimum wage. So far, the general interpretation does not forbid the employer to deduct the costs for
accommodation or food supply from the minimum wage. 
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Other reasons why little incentive exists for posted employees from within and outside the EU to pursue their rights are
highlighted in the Austrian and/or French reports. They include the following:
 the workers fear that they will get no future work from their current employer or perhaps even from other employers;
 they are afraid because they are irregularly residing in the host country and therefore at risk of deportation;
 in the construction sector, it is often difficult to produce evidence of fraudulent practices regarding the pay level and
working hours, because of non-transparent circumstances and often varying sites and workmates;
 trade unions in the host country are sometimes disinclined to exercise legal action on behalf of foreign workers, who
are mostly not members;
 the temporary presence of posted workers in the host country complicates the matter of introducing their claims before
the courts of the state;
 illegal work and bogus subcontracting are to a certain extent socially and economically accepted. As a consequence,
few workers are inclined to pursue legal action to regularise their working relations or recover due wages;
 due to the large wage gap between sending and receiving countries, the wage is – even if it is far below the minimum
wage level of the host country – usually higher than the wage that the employees earn in their countries of origin. 
Finally, the position of posted workers is also influenced by particular aspects of the construction sector in a specific
country, as was pointed out by one Italian trade union representative. In Italy, self-employed workers without employees
account for 47% of the labour force in the construction sector. This has a considerably destabilising effect on the
entrepreneurial system, especially in light of the lower cost of labour which such workers are expected to accept. The
majority of these self-employed workers without employees are migrants. Indeed, it is much easier for self-employed
workers who are registered with the trade register to renew their immigration permit than it is for employees. If the latter
lose their job, they have only six months to find a new job before their immigration permit expires.
Legal context
Another reason why, in the context of cross-border subcontracting practices, the implemented norms and instruments on
liability may be much less effective is of a legal nature. 
In Belgium, the client or principal contractor does not have to withhold money and the liability cannot be invoked if the
foreign subcontractor has no ‘social debts’ in Belgium and if all of its workers possess a valid transfer certificate (E101
form). In such cases, these workers do not fall under the scope of the Belgian social security system at all, provided that
they do not exceed the prescribed length of posting in Article 14, Paragraphs 1a and 1b of Regulation (EEC) No.
1408/71. 
The report on Finland notes that the Liability Act faces shortcomings in cross-border situations. With regard to wages,
the only statutory guarantee in respect of the workers is the employer insolvency procedure in the home country. As for
taxes, posted workers of a foreign subcontractor staying in Finland longer than six months are taxpayers in Finland,
while since 2007, workers posted by a temporary work agency from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Nordic countries and
from states without a tax treaty with Finland are also considered taxpayers in Finland. According to the information
given to the general public by the tax authorities, tax negligence is common when foreign employers without a fixed
place of business in Finland are not covered by the payroll tax procedure. 
Regarding the Netherlands, the national findings are that the system works in a cross-border context if foreign service
providers are covered by the Dutch tax law and laws on social security contributions. This is only the case for a minor
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group of service providers in specific situations explained in more detail in Chapter 2 of the national report. Therefore,
all of the Dutch interviewees agree that the system is in general not effective regarding subcontractors from abroad who
are only temporarily carrying out services in the Netherlands and are not established on Dutch territory. 
Although this problem of non-coverage by the liability rules was specifically reported in these three countries, it occurs
in all Member States in respect of social security contributions since it originates from the exclusion of posted workers
from the state-of-employment principle in Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 (see, for example, Pennings, 2005). For taxes,
the coverage depends on the bilateral treaties of Member States, but most of them are based on the OECD model tax
convention, which stipulates that for posted workers staying no longer than 183 days taxes are due in the country of
origin.
Enforcement of rules
In France, enforcement of the rules is complicated. One problem that was mentioned concerns the internal organisation
of the labour inspectorate. In effect, the French labour inspectorate is extremely decentralised. As a result, each of the
relevant actors in the construction process – client, principal contractor or subcontractors – may be covered by a different
inspector. Therefore, in order to establish an offence, different inspectors need to cooperate. However, they have an
institutional freedom to decide whether an enquiry is necessary. Consequently, they need to be convinced of the interest
of the case before they engage in such a time-consuming process. Thus, many enquiries cease before they reach a formal
conclusion. 
In addition to this internal problem at the labour inspectorate, cooperation between different administrations – social
security, Inland Revenue and the labour inspectorate – is also a delicate matter because each of them tends to evaluate
the situation according to their own criteria. For instance, Inland Revenue might decline assistance to the labour
inspectorate if it considers that the sum of money it might accrue as a result of an in-depth enquiry might not be worth
the trouble. This is why it was important to establish and maintain an interministerial delegation to coordinate the
activities of different administrative departments. DILTI used to act as this authority, but has now been replaced by a
similar institution – DNLF – acting against fraud in a broader context than illegal work only. 
The CGT representative stated that controls by labour inspectors seem unsatisfactory as they tend to take place during
office and normal working hours while offences predominately occur outside these time slots. The CGT official also
complained about the fact that trade unions are denied the necessary prerequisites to track down offences. For instance,
trade union representatives have very little time – 15 hours a month – to make enquiries on their own. In addition, most
of the subcontractors are small businesses and therefore do not satisfy the thresholds required by law for the existence
of trade union representatives.
Research by DILTI (2005) revealed that controls of foreign contractors have not kept pace with the increased activities
of these cross-border service providers on French territory. According to the DILTI report, the number of foreign
contractors undertaking the required declaration formalities has increased by 79.9% in one year: from 3,426 companies
in 2003 to 6,163 companies in 2004. Meanwhile, posted workers included in the declaration procedure have increased
from 16,545 persons in 2003 to 23,101 persons in 2004 (39.6%). However, the estimated numbers of posted workers are
much higher, ranging from 94,732 to 118,415 persons in 2003 and from 126,109 to 157,636 persons in 2004. An
additional difficulty arises from the fact that, although the declaration numbers have risen substantially, they are still
insignificant in comparison to the estimated actual number of posted workers. As a result, both DILTI and the French
Ministry of Labour, Social Relations, Family Affairs and Solidarity (Ministère du Travail, des Relations Sociales, de la
Famille et de la Solidarité) recognise that controls of foreign contractors need to be intensified. The ministry also
recognises that, although the social partners have done much to spread information on the requirement of declaration
formalities to foreign contractors, much more remains to be done.
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Apart from enforcement problems related to a lack of domestic cooperation within and among authorities, it is – as was
stated in the Belgian report – more difficult for national institutions to check whether a foreign company has ‘social and
tax debts’ compared with a domestic enterprise. Such checks cannot be done properly without cooperation with foreign
authorities, which is only slowly progressing. 
The representatives of the French employer organisation FFB consider that the current French liability system is
inappropriate in the context of cross-border subcontracting as it encourages foreign contractors to avoid their
responsibilities – to the detriment of the local client or (sub)contractor. In effect, once the foreign subcontractors have
returned to their country of origin, it is difficult to contact them and therefore easier to engage the liability of the local
party. 
The German report focuses on deficiencies in the system of legal enforcement of decisions and other enforceable titles
concerning the employer established abroad. Cross-border enforcement is barely possible and in practice represents a
significant obstacle. This problem does not occur in respect of domestic employers. Under the German minimum wages
liability regime, usually domestic employers are subject to the liability; therefore, in practice the enforcement of titles
abroad is not often necessary. However, if it is necessary to enforce a judgement abroad, usually the foreign court does
not recognise the judgement. 
Suggestions for possible solutions
In Belgium, trade unions favour a liability on wages for clients and principal contractors. On the other hand, employer
organisations consider that a wage liability is not realistic because their members cannot ask a subcontractor to disclose
the salaries which it is paying to its employees. They believe that it is the authorities’ duty to check whether their
subcontractors comply with the laws relating to wages and working conditions. Employers are also concerned about how
it would be possible to avoid this liability. Nevertheless, if such a system were developed, they believe that it would be
important to plan it in detail. In fact, a government initiative has sought to link the adoption of a joint liability for clients
and principal contractors concerning the wages of posted workers with the lifting of restrictions on the free movement
of workers from the new EU Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004. However, the government did not reach
a consensus on this matter before the most recent elections of June 2007. If no agreement is reached before 1 May 2009,
the free movement of workers will probably enter into effect on that date without liability on wages being established.
Now the actors have the impression that what they do may violate the free movement of services. In this context, one
employer organisation emphasised the need for a European framework on bogus self-employed workers. More
specifically, the Federal Public Service Social Security is in favour of a European databank on companies or a linking
of national databanks. 
In France, recognising the fact that the European enlargement of 2004 has had a special impact on the construction
industry – including risks of social dumping – a senate report from 2006 made 14 proposals for improving the current
system. The most important of these recommendations concern control and liability enhancement; the first proposal
underlines the need for mandatory declaration requirements prior to posting workers. Although declaration requirements
should not be used as a means of restricting service provision, such requirements should still be met in order to identify
the workers, making sure that they remain protected under national and European legislation. 
In the context of the ineffective liability arrangements on social security contributions and tax charges in cross-border
situations, in the Netherlands trade unions are in favour of the introduction of a legislative system of liability for wages.
This system should include the mandatory minimum wage level by law and by generally binding CLAs. The unions
envisage a system similar to the German liability arrangement on wages, holidays and social fund payments. However,
employer organisations do not favour a legislative liability arrangement for wages. Neither do they support a
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transformation of the present social clause in Article 96 of the CLA for the construction industry into a real liability
arrangement. In the view of the main association of building contractors, Constructing Netherlands (Bouwend
Nederland), the old provision was abolished almost 10 years ago not only because employers disliked the liability clause,
but also because employees of subcontractors that comply with the CLA provisions resented the intrusion on their
privacy caused by this provision. To be sure of correct payment, the main contractor could ask the subcontractor to
supply details regarding wage slips, employment contracts and identity cards of the employees. 
A legislative chain liability arrangement for wages has been the subject of political debate but has so far been rejected
by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. However, in a press release of 19 June 2008, Minister Jan Piet Hein
Donner announced the preparation of a bill on liability for the wages of temporary agency workers in user companies
which make use of non-certified temporary work agencies. The liability will be limited to the statutory minimum wage
level. This legislative proposal is meant to encourage the use of NEN-certified temporary work agencies.
Impact of rules on SMEs 
Given the fact that the majority of contractors operating in the construction industry belong to the category of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), this section pay special attention to the findings of five of the national reports. For
Finland, Germany and Italy, no specific details could be reported on this issue.
Level of awareness
The situation in the Member States differs with regard to the level of awareness of SMEs concerning the existence of
liability rules. In Austria, awareness of the liability rules is low, which may be explained by the extremely low practical
relevance of these rules. Regarding the Spanish construction sector, SMEs are less well-informed than larger companies
about legislation in the area of liability and subcontracting. More information needs to be disseminated on this aspect.
In contrast, in Belgium, France and the Netherlands, SMEs seem to be well aware of the liability rules that apply to them.
French employer organisations maintain that, thanks to their assistance, their members know their legal obligations and
abide by them. For the Dutch SMEs, this awareness is inherent to the system: the main contractor, which is generally a
large-scale enterprise, will demand all necessary data from the subcontractor, usually an SME. If the information
supplied by the subcontractor is incomplete, it will not get paid by the main contractor. 
Suitability of rules
Regarding the suitability of the rules for SMEs, in Austria employer representatives call for special attention for this
group and emphasise the need for clear and manageable rules. In general, SMEs – particularly small enterprises – do not
have a structure to deal with complex legal matters, such as a legal department. Belgian employer organisations believe
that their previous legislation was too complicated for SMEs. Even now the system is still complicated, especially for
certain clients. Under the old legislation, a client could check if a contractor was registered; now it has to be aware that
it must check the Federal Public Service website to see if a contractor has debts. From France, it is reported that,
according to the relevant employer organisations – FNTP and FFB – legal provisions on liability do not seem to have
adversely affected SMEs. However, it is more difficult for them to comply with legal provisions as they do not have legal
advisors. 
In the Netherlands, a bill by the Dutch Ministry of Finance, proposing to change the preventive G-account system into
a deposit system, aims to improve the situation for SMEs. The ministry explains that an outstanding amount of about
€3.5 to €4 billion is lodged in G-accounts, which is a considerable, blocked sum. The enterprises cannot invest this
money, for example, which means a loss of working capital. The Building Contractors’ Federation Netherlands, mainly
representing SMEs, confirms this view. According to this organisation, the main contractors try to pay a large part of the
invoice on the G-account of the subcontractor, because for this sum they are indemnified against liability. Unblocking
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the G-account takes time and administrative effort. However, the spokesperson of the employer organisation Bouwend
Nederland – which mainly represents principal contractors – reports that its members are satisfied with the current G-
account system because their main interest is in preventing liability. 
Soft law and related initiatives 
In three Member States, the use of soft law tools or related initiatives was mentioned in the context of liability rules in
subcontracting processes.  
In France, in 2005, seven employer organisations for the construction sector and five trade unions signed a non-legally
binding document (Charte de bonne conduite) aiming to combat illegal work. This document includes advice for clients,
principal contractors and subcontractors in order to ensure that they comply with legislation and avoid criminal sanction
and civil liability. According to the most recent report on this subject from the French Ministry of Labour, Social
Relations, Family Affairs and Solidarity, similar agreements exist in the activity of temporary agency work, in the
security industry and – as of 29 February 2008 – in the agricultural sector.
To enhance the compliance of temporary work agencies operating in the Netherlands, in 2006 the industry introduced a
self-regulatory measure. This is the NEN-norm for preventing liability of user companies in relation to labour from
temporary work agencies. The first NEN-norm applies to agencies established in the Netherlands, but a second norm
regarding temporary work agencies established abroad will also be issued in 2008. 
To encourage the use of accredited temporary work agencies, some generally applicable CLAs oblige the employer to
contract a qualified agency. However, the CLA for the construction industry does not contain such an obligation.
Regarding Finland, the employer organisation RT highlights the need to replace paper copies of certificates and accounts
by electronic versions. RT has sponsored a private internet service designed by the software company Aspida Oy that is
already operational in Finnish but is still subject to development in two dimensions. Firstly, RT wants to increase the
availability of electronic data and, secondly, to facilitate data collection from abroad, especially from Estonia and Poland.
RT would like tax and pension insurance data to be more broadly available on the Internet through an electronic proxy
or ‘eproxy’ issued by the companies using the web service. The ‘eproxy’ would empower the web service to gather and
distribute the data. 
Future developments   
The national reports include numerous suggestions by the interviewees on possible solutions to the shortcomings
identified in the domestic or cross-border context. Some of these have been outlined in the previous sections. Below,
specific attention is given to legislative developments in Austria since this entails an initiative which has already been
adopted. 
Recently, in Austria an Act for a liability arrangement regarding social security contributions was adopted with the aim
of diminishing the problem of bogus or ‘bubble’ companies. This act is based on a government initiative, which was
further developed by the social partners; it should come into force on 1 January 2009. The new bill covers social security
contributions and will only apply in the construction sector. It has some elements of the Austrian ‘reverse charge’ system
regarding turnover tax: ‘reverse charge’ means that the taxes are paid by the contractor and not by the subcontractor. The
new act also includes certain aspects of the German provisions on liability in subcontracting process – especially Article
28e of the Fourth Book of the Social Security Code (Viertes Buch des Sozialgesetzbuches, SGB IV) providing for a
liability of the principal contractor – as well as the Dutch system.
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The key elements of the provisions are as follows. In general, the contractor is liable for the social security contributions
of the subcontractor, but this liability is limited to 20% of the payment to the subcontractor. This means, on the one hand,
that if the subcontractor goes bankrupt and the unpaid social security contributions amount to more than 20% of the
payment to the subcontractor, the Regional Fund for Sickness Insurance will receive this 20% at most. On the other hand,
the liability is not limited to the specific contract. The advantage for the contractor is that it can calculate costs more
easily. The advantage for the Regional Fund for Sickness Insurance is that it does not have to prove that the outstanding
social security contributions have resulted from the specific contract between the subcontractor and contractor. Due to
the non-transparent division of labour within the construction sector and the usual lack of information of the regional
sick fund, the system could not function otherwise.
The contractor is not liable in the following two instances: 
 The first case is if the subcontractor is on a certain list. This register is compiled by the regional sick fund and a
company can be added to the list if it has a clean record. 
 The second case is when the contractor pays 20% of the payment directly to the regional sick fund. This means that it
pays 80% to the subcontractor and 20% to the Regional Fund for Sickness Insurance. The contractor therefore has no
further obligations to the subcontractor; the situation is as if it has paid 100% to the subcontractor. Afterwards, the
subcontractor can request its 20% from the sick fund and, if no outstanding contributions apply, it will receive the full
20%. If some contributions are outstanding, it will get no payment at all or the remaining sum after deduction of the
outstanding debts. 
For example, the full amount of the payment is €100,000. The contractor pays €80,000 directly to the subcontractor and
€20,000 to the Regional Fund for Sickness Insurance. Afterwards, the subcontractor can request €20,000 from the fund.
However, due to the fact that the subcontractor owes €15,000 in outstanding social security contributions, it will get
€5,000. 
The proposed provisions are somewhat more detailed than explained above and will perhaps not prove to be a perfect
solution. Nevertheless – according to the actors involved – they present the best solution that is currently possible.
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This final chapter presents some concluding observations and elements for consideration for governments and social
partner organisations as the main interest groups concerned by the current debate on liability in subcontracting processes
in the construction sector. It also serves to highlight the similarities and differences between the national systems
analysed, as well as the positive components, shortcomings and problems which these represent for the actors involved
in the different Member States. 
Similarities and differences of national regulations
The central findings of the report reveal the significant differences that exist between the various national subcontracting
liability regulations in place. Due to the different traditions of legislation and industrial relations in the countries concerned,
research results in this matter are highly specific to the national situation. Nonetheless, findings across the eight countries
were similar in relation to the objectives of the regulations, the substantive and territorial scope, the mainly legislative form
of the instruments and the involvement of social partners in one way or another. The similarities found can be useful as a
source of comparative information for national policymakers and social partners in order to help them to make more
informed choices on this subject. The most notable differences among the national laws were found in relation to the
personal scope and nature of the liability, the actors involved in the process and the preventive measures and sanctions that
exist. Regulations may be based on chain liability, on liability limited to a part of the chain or on purely contractual liability.
Liability may or may not involve the client of a building project, in addition to the principal contractor. 
Assessment of regulations at national level
Substantial differences were identified in relation to the effectiveness of the liability instruments with regard to their
objectives and the level of compliance. In all of the eight Member States under study, monitoring compliance is a
complex issue involving multiple actors. Each Member State strikes a different balance between preventive measures,
sanctions, and enforcement efforts and possibilities. In purely domestic situations, some Member States face serious
problems regarding the effectiveness of their liability rules, while in others no structural enforcement problems appear
to exist. However, regarding cross-border subcontracting, considerable enforcement difficulties were reported in all
Member States.  
Domestic context
For Belgium and Finland, the national reports conclude that the legislation was too recently implemented to give a proper
evaluation concerning its impact. Nonetheless, in Finland, the stakeholders interviewed were positive about the long-
established arrangements in the Collective Labour Agreement. Regarding Spain, the same inability to assess the recently
adopted Law 32/2006 was reported as in Belgium and Finland, but the general package of laws on liability was assessed
rather positively by all the stakeholders. 
In general, the German and Dutch reports are positive about the effectiveness of at least the majority of their rules,
although this does not imply that all stakeholders are satisfied with the rules in place. A clear exception to this broadly
positive picture was made for the German liability arrangement concerning social security contributions, which was
pinpointed as ineffective as well as causing considerable bureaucracy. In the Netherlands, the social clause on wages in
the CLAs was assessed as symbolic rather than effective. 
The Austrian report was clear about the ineffectiveness of the rules in place, while the regulations in France and Italy
were also predominantly assessed as not very effective. However, this negative view did not apply to all elements and
mainly concerned foreign subcontractors. In Italy, the ‘Single Insurance Contribution Payment Certificate’ (DURC) in
particular was judged positively by all of the actors involved. Moreover, in Austria new rules are underway which are
expected to have a positive impact on the problems encountered (see previous chapter).
Conclusions
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Cross-border context
Despite all of the differences regarding the domestic effectiveness of the rules, a clear similarity between all of the
Member States studied refers to the serious enforcement problems with regard to cross-border subcontracting. One
important reason behind this is the fact that liability rules for social security contributions and tax charges generally do
not apply to foreign contractors providing temporary services in another Member State. Rules of conflict stipulate that
foreign subcontractors are mainly not covered by the substantive social security schemes and tax laws in the host state.
This implies that, from a cross-border perspective, national liability regulations for wages are in fact the only option
which might be effective, since for labour law issues the EU posted workers directive (Directive 96/71/EC) requires
foreign contractors to abide by certain minimum mandatory employment conditions in the host state. Nevertheless,
liability for wages is not only a politically sensitive issue but also poses some problems especially with regard to the
cross-border execution of back payments.
Elements affecting effectiveness
Detailed analysis of the interviews conducted with the relevant stakeholders for the national reports revealed that certain
elements were clearly salient and frequently identified by these parties as either increasing or diminishing the chances
of an effective liability arrangement in a domestic context. 
However, before listing them, the limitations of the present study – as outlined at the start of the report – should be
recalled. Given the exploratory and mainly fact-finding and descriptive nature of this report, further more in-depth and
case-study based research on this topic would be a prerequisite before any definite conclusions on what works or not
could be drawn. Even then, it will still be difficult to extrapolate research results from one country to another, given the
different traditions of legislation and industrial relations in the particular countries.
Enhancing components
Taking into account these caveats, two main elements were often identified by parties as being potential building blocks
of an effective liability arrangement:
 preventive tools which reward the clients or principal contractors with limitation or exemption from liability;
 involvement of the social partners in the development, implementation and application of the arrangements. This is a
feature of most of the measures categorised as good practice. 
In relation to chain liability, the European social partners of the construction sector and their member organisations have
opposing views as to its pertinence and effectiveness. Trade unions consider that unconditioned chain liability presents
the most effective tool for a well-functioning system. Meanwhile employers argue that unconditioned chain liability is
economically and contractually inadequate. 
Addressing shortcomings
With regard to regulations that were considered ineffective or less effective, a distinction should be made between a)
problems inherent to the nature of the regulation; and b) problems related to the implementation of the regulation. Again,
it must be emphasised that the findings are not meant to prescribe or recommend anything. Rather, they should be seen
as a starting point for further debate and research.
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Concerning inherent problems, a narrow scope of the liability, such as limitation to only one level of the chain, was often
cited by some of the stakeholders interviewed as a reason for ineffective arrangements. Furthermore, exceptions – such
as inapplicability of the rules if the subcontractor is insolvent – or complex and/or burdensome administrative preventive
obligations were mentioned as contributing factors to a low practical impact of the rules concerned.  
Regarding implementation problems, some of the main challenges identified by those interviewed included too many
and/or competing monitoring institutions with different priorities. Moreover, continuous transformation and amendment
of regulations in force and/or delay in implementation also adversely affects the monitoring power of inspectorates.
A further inherent problem faced in all of the eight countries under study concerns the fact that the regulations examined
concentrate particularly on national circumstances. It is therefore not surprising that the most striking gaps are to be
found in cross-border situations; implementation of the rules in cross-border subcontracting processes is especially
difficult. 
Exchanging knowledge and experience
The bill recently put forward in Austria aiming to tackle the problem of bogus or ‘bubble’ companies in the construction
sector is an example of how Member States might seek inspiration from one another’s good practices. In this context,
the Austrian bill contains a liability arrangement regarding social security contributions and resembles part of the Dutch
and German liability provisions.
Further elements for discussion
Considerations for national legislators
On the basis of the research results – and bearing in mind the limitations of the present study – the following ideas could
be further explored by national policymakers striving for a well-functioning liability arrangement.
Domestic context
Lawmaking process
 Include social partners (in the construction industry) in the development, implementation and application of the
regulations.
Content of regulation
 In the case of new regulation being developed, this should be kept simple and be accessible and comprehensible.
 It is important to reduce costs linked to bureaucracy and to avoid creating an administrative burden for users. 
Enforcement of regulation
 Create tools that prevent the possibility of liability on the contracting parties and at the same time guarantee the
payment of social security contributions, wage taxes and/or minimum wages at least.
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
47
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
 Consider in particular possibly optional tools that prevent the chance of liability for the contractor:
 in such a way that if a contractor observes these preventive measures – which should ideally be possible without   
the cooperation of the subcontractor –  it will not be liable or at least will limit its liability;
27
 possibly combined with other preventive tools such as a general reliability check of the subcontracting party, at 
best supported by a register or list of reliable subcontractors.
28
 Combine preventive measures where necessary with other sanctions such as back-payment obligations, fines and/or
alternative or additional penalties.
 Provide an effective enforcement of the regulation. Important conditions to guarantee this are: 
 one monitoring institution or several monitoring institutions that work in cooperation with each other;
 a steady regulation that is not continuously being transformed.
Cross-border context
Useful tools to improve the enforcement and application of the liability arrangements of the Member States on foreign
subcontractors and/or temporary work agencies within the current legal context could include the following. 
 Make registers or lists of reliable subcontractors of the different Member States accessible throughout the EU.
29
 Ideally, this should be supported by the set-up of an easily accessible EU website for recipient parties, such as the
client, principal contractor or intermediary contractor, with general information on cross-border outsourcing of work
and links to the national registers or lists of reliable subcontractors.
 Promote further cross-border cooperation and coordination between the relevant authorities of the different Member
States with regard to the enforcement of each other’s liability regulations, the exchange of information and other
measures.
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At the same time, these measures should secure the collection of social security and tax debt. Examples of such preventive
regulations are: 
 the German obligatory tool regarding wage tax: the (sub)contractor should submit either an exemption certificate or, if this is not
possible, the recipient party – the (principal) contractor – should withhold tax to the amount of 15% of the remuneration and pay
this to the Inland Revenue; 
 the Dutch G-account or direct transfer system regarding social security contributions and wage tax: the (principal) contractor pays
the (sub)contractor exclusive of the wage tax and social security contributions owed, which are transferred directly to the G-
account or deposit, and is then protected against liability for the portion paid; 
 the new bill in Austria regarding social security contributions in the construction sector: the contractor is not liable in two cases:
firstly, if the subcontractor is on a certain approved list and, secondly, if the contractor pays 20% of the payment directly to the
Regional Fund for Sickness Insurance.
28
See the German and proposed Austrian regulation as briefly described in the previous footnote. 
29
See the proposal of the Finnish Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries (RT) outlined in the previous chapter.
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Wages and legal advice
 Make one institution in every Member State responsible for the legal aid of posted workers, including the supply of
legal information in different languages; setting up a comprehensible website would be helpful in this regard.
 Ideally, this should be supported by the establishment of an easily accessible EU information service, such as a website
– available in all EU languages – with general information on posted work and links to other posted worker websites
of the Member States.
30
 Examine ways to avoid cross-border judicial proceedings – for instance, the possible payment of the wage debt to the
worker by the above institution and the transfer of the wage claim to the institution, which would then act in
accordance.
Social security and wage tax obligations
 Enhance the enforcement of the rules of the host country, as well as of the country of origin, by improving the
transparency and monitoring of the rules. This may involve for instance:
 registration of posted workers;
31
 designation of one monitoring authority in each Member State or several, closely cooperating authorities;
 if necessary, a limitation of the subcontracting chain to a maximum number of vertical levels.
32
All of the tools mentioned in the cross-border context should ideally be reinforced by an enhanced administrative and
practical cooperation between the Member States in the context of the posting of workers (see also European
Commission, 2008a and 2008b).
Considerations for social partners
One of the principal research findings was that social partner organisations do not always agree on the desirability of
liability rules in place and consequently do not agree either as to what may be considered a good practice. A rather
obvious reason for this divergence of views may be that clients and/or contractors see the government as being
responsible for enforcing these rules, and increasing the liability of the main contractor would burden them with
monitoring and compliance responsibilities. However, sometimes employer organisations are positive about having
wider liability rules in place, since such regulation can help to promote fair competition and a level playing field in
favour of fair and law-abiding companies.
33
An important element worth highlighting is that of guaranteeing social partner involvement in the negotiating and
adoption process, as well as in the implementation of liability arrangements. This aspect emerged as an essential
ingredient for the good practices mentioned in the eight country reports. However, in many other EU Member States
liability is not – or not yet – a politically feasible option, as it is not regarded as a priority issue by the parties concerned. 
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
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Consider the Austrian-Hungarian cross-border cooperation between the trade unions. 
31
As in France.
32
As in Spain, where – for example – the subcontracting chain in building projects is limited to no more than three vertical levels.
However, such a limitation will also limit the outsourcing possibilities of companies.
33
This positive view is apparent in the Netherlands, where this is the case for both employer organisations representing SMEs and
principal contractors. To a lesser extent, it is also true in Finland, France and Italy in respect of employer organisations representing
principal contractors.
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In such a context, a possible alternative strategy aiming to diminish problems in the lower ends of subcontracting chains
– especially where posted workers are involved – might be to encourage corporate or sector-based social responsibility
initiatives in subcontracting processes. These actions can be seen as a voluntary commitment by clients or contractors to
manage their relationships with subcontractors in a responsible way. Such initiatives might be developed through the
normal social partner channels of consultation and negotiation.
Finally, it is important to mention that contractor selection is of crucial importance in chain responsibility arrangements.
In the context of procurement, cost cannot be the only factor to take into consideration when selecting contracting parties
for a building project. Directive 2004/18/EC
34
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts,
public supply contracts and public service contracts and Convention No. 94
35
of the International Labour Organization
(ILO) on labour clauses in public contracts respectively enable and require provisions or social clauses in government
procurement contracts to ensure the compliance of subcontractors with labour standards. The objective is to ensure that
conditions imposed by public authorities in their role as client, such as low pricing policies or tight deadlines, do not
undermine the capacity of subcontractors to comply with relevant labour and social standards. 
The aim of this comparative report is to facilitate the exchange of experience and good practice among Member States
on the subject of liability in subcontracting processes, and to enable social partners and legislators to be better informed
in relation to this subject. 
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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0018:EN:HTML
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http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C094
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Annex: National summaries of liability
arrangements
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Austria 
36
Regulation Anti Abuse Act Law on agency work
Nature of the
liability
Liability is restricted to the direct contracting party of
the subcontractor, in other words, to one level of
subcontracting. Furthermore, the liability of Article 7c.3
AVRAG is restricted to the highest level in the
subcontracting chain
‘Normal’ liability and secondary liability – if the user
company can prove that it has fulfilled its financial
obligations deriving from the contract between the
temporary work agency and the user company
Objectives Combating non-payment and abuse of employees in the
context of (cross-border) subcontracting practices and
thus avoiding potential cases of social dumping and
illegal business competition
Liability
covers 
 Wages  Wages
 Social security contributions
Personal
scope
 Principal contractor and user company
 All employees, except employees in public services,
namely those who have a contract with the
government. ‘All employees’ also includes ‘flexible’
workers such as those with fixed-term contracts or
working part time 
 User company
 Temporary work agency 
 All employees and also people who are economically
dependent (arbeitnehmerähnlich). The latter are similar
to employees, as their work is dependent on one
employer. However, they are not officially employed
by the employer
Territorial
scope
Any contractor providing services in Austria Applies throughout the country 
Preventive
measures
 No specific legal obligations exist to make certain
checks
 No specific procedural arrangements are made to
guarantee payment by subcontractors
 Not applicable if the subcontractor is insolvent
 No specific legal obligations exist to make certain
checks
 No specific procedural arrangements are made to
guarantee payment
 Not applicable if the temporary work agency is
insolvent
Sanctions No back-payment obligations or – in practice –
additional penalties exist for the liable contractors.
However, in theory, a provision in the Federal Public
Procurement Law (BVergG)  states that a company must
be excluded from the procurement procedure if it is
found to have committed severe offences against labour
law or social security law
-
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
Trade unions act on behalf of the employee not only out
of court, but also in court proceedings, with no financial
risk for the employee. The Chamber of Labour also
provides legal assistance
Liability will rarely be applicable from the moment the
user company has paid its financial obligations.
Therefore, the risk of losing the proceedings is high for
employees 
Actors
involved
 Employees and their representatives
 Principal contractor and employer representatives
 Judges
 Employees and their representatives
 User company and temporary work agency
 Judges
36
A new law is planned, based on tripartite negotiations. Decision making was expected by the summer of 2008. 
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Belgium
Regulation Liability Act Law on agency work
Nature of the
liability
Mainly a contractual liability. The liability will acquire a
joint nature if the contracting party of the contractor
with social security and tax debts has failed to meet its
obligations after being formally pressed for payment.
Only if these conditions are fulfilled will the next level
in the chain be addressed 
Liability arises if the employer (temporary work
agency) transfers part of its authority to the user
company 
Objective of
liability
The objective of the law is to combat so-called
gangmasters and bogus subcontracting practices and to
safeguard the public interest in the collection of social
and fiscal charges on wages. For the social partners, the
objective is also to prevent unfair competition
Scope of
liability  
 Wage tax, limited to 35% of the total amount of work
 Social security contributions and social fund
payments, in combination with tax liability limited to
65% of the total amount of work, otherwise 100% 
 Social security contributions
 Wages and all work-related benefits
Personal
scope
 All contractors carrying out certain work; this work
mainly covers the construction sector
 All employees of said contractors
 User company
 All temporary agency workers except posted workers
from abroad 
Territorial
scope
 Any contractor performing work on Belgian territory  Applies throughout the country 
Preventive
measures
 No specific legal obligations exist to make certain
checks
 No specific procedural arrangements are made to
guarantee payment by subcontractors
 No specific legal obligations exist to prevent liability 
Sanctions No back-payment obligations exist for the liable
contractors; however, a penalty does exist in the form of
a small fine, along with a surcharge equal to the amount
of withholding that should have been made – in addition
to the withholding itself
If part of the authority is transferred to the user
company, the employment contract of the agency
worker with the temporary work agency will be
automatically transformed into an open-ended contract
with the user company
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
 Workers can go directly to the Labour Tribunal or they
may be represented by their trade union, if they have
been a member for at least six months. In other cases –
especially important for cross-border posted workers –
the trade union will decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the worker will get legal assistance
 Workers can also lodge a complaint through the labour
inspectorate 
Liability will hardly ever be applicable, because it is
difficult to prove that part of the authority has been
transferred
Actors
involved
 Federal Public Service Social Security
 Federal Public Service Finance
 Registration committee and their stakeholders
 Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and
Social Dialogue
 Federal Public Service Social Security
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Finland
Regulation Liability Act Penal code Collective agreements
Nature of the
liability
Liability only in relation to the
contracting partner – no chain
liability
Partly a chain liability, for the part of
the confiscation possibility
Liability as a guarantor that has kept
the benefit of execution
Objectives The general objectives of the liability regulations – and especially of the Liability Act – are: promoting equal
competition between companies, ensuring observance of the terms of employment and, indirectly, combating abuse
of workers and enhancing the collection of social and fiscal charges
Scope of
liability 
 Wage tax 
 Social security contributions
Payment of too low wages in case of
posted workers
Wages and holiday payment
Personal
scope
 User companies, unless the work
does not exceed 10 days
 Subcontracting in building: clients
acting as builders and contractors
contracting out part of the work at
a shared workplace, unless the
compensation is less than €7,500
excluding VAT
Principal contractor or other
subscriber of labour, including the
client
Principal contractors, including user
companies, bound by the collective
agreement 
Territorial
scope
Applies throughout the country; also
covers foreign contractors or
temporary work agencies when
active in Finland
Applies throughout the country; also
covers foreign contractors or
temporary work agencies when
posting workers in Finland
Agreements apply nationwide 
Preventive
measures
Evidence obligation: the contractor
must require from the contracting
partner certain information on the
reliability of the subcontractor or
temporary work agency. This
obligation is waived if the contractor
has ‘good reason to trust’ that the
contracting partner will fulfil the
obligations, for example, if it is a
public institution or public limited
company
- Housing construction agreement:
any subcontracting agreement must
include a provision which obliges
the subcontractor and temporary
work agency to respect the terms
and conditions of employment in the
sector’s nationwide CLA 
Agreements of 2007 and 2008: the
principal contractor is not liable if it
has fulfilled the evidence obligation
of the Liability Act
Repressive
measures
Negligence fee of €1,500–€15,000 in
case of neglecting evidence
obligation
 Criminal offence as discrimination
based on nationality
 Confiscation of the illegal benefit
gained by paying illegally low
wages; this claim can also be
directed against a principal
contractor or other subscriber;
confiscation is not possible if the
worker presents their wage claim
Moral obligation to pay outstanding
wages and holiday pay of the
subcontractor’s or temporary work
agency’s workers, if wages are
earned on the principal contractor’s
site and declared within seven days
after the due date
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
No No No
Actors
involved
 Occupational safety and health
authorities 
 Uusimaa Safety and Health District
 Social partners, taxation and
pension insurance authorities
Public prosecutor for confiscation
claims
Social partners who are parties to the
agreements
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France
Regulation
37 Liability regarding (bogus)
subcontracting
Liability regarding temporary
agency work
Liability regarding undeclared /
illegal work
Nature of the
liability
Joint liability of the client together
with the contractors, only in relation
to the contracting partner – no chain
liability
User company is jointly liable if the
temporary work agency defaults and
its insurance is insufficient to pay
the outstanding wages to the agency
workers, as well as the social
security contributions on their behalf
Joint liability of the client, together
with the contractors, regarding the
direct subcontracting relationship for
all contracts for services worth more
than €3,000, if these parties did not
verify the requisite documents of
their contractor. No chain liability
applies
Objectives Stabilising employment and
regularising precarious forms of
work
Strengthening the protection of
temporary agency workers
Providing an additional guarantee
for payment of wages, social
security contributions and taxes in
case of a fraudulent or missing
contractor
Scope of
liability  
 Wages and related benefits such as
holiday payments
 Social security contributions
 Coverage may be extended or
limited depending on whether the
work is performed at the workplace
or worksite of principal contractor
or client 
 Wages
 Social security contributions
 Taxes 
 Social security contributions
 Penalties owed to workers
Personal
scope
 Client, principal contractor or
intermediary contractor
 Workers of the subcontractor
 User company
 Temporary agency workers
 Client – including individuals,
local authorities and the state –
together with the principal or only
contractor
 Workers, Inland Revenue, social
security collecting authorities
Territorial
scope
Applies throughout the country; also
covers foreign contractors when
active in France
Applies throughout the country; also
covers temporary agency workers
from foreign agencies when posting
workers in France; however, to some
extent foreign agencies may have
fewer obligations
Applies throughout the country; also
covers foreign contractors when
active in France
Preventive
measures
Obligation to screen the
(sub)contractor: the recipient party –
client or principal/intermediary
contractor – must ensure that the
subcontractor complies with
employment law
 Temporary work agencies need to
provide a guarantee of insurance
that their workers’ related
obligations will be fulfilled even if
the agency defaults
 No legal obligation but possibility
for the user company to require
from the temporary work agency a
certificate attesting the payment of
social security contributions in
order to diminish its chances of
liability  
 Obligation for the recipient party to
verify every six months whether
the (sub)contractor has
accomplished all declaration
formalities required in order to
provide services as an independent
contractor or to employ others 
 Obligation for the foreign
(sub)contractor or temporary work
agency and/or recipient party or
user company to deliver a
declaration with information on
posted workers to the competent
regional labour inspectorate or
employment director before the
workers start to carry out their
work
37
In addition to the three arrangements outlined here, a liability of the client exists towards the subcontractors of an insolvent
principal contractor. Indirectly, this may also benefit the workers of the subcontractor. 
56
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
France (cont’d)
Regulation Liability regarding (bogus)
subcontracting
Liability regarding temporary
agency work
Liability regarding undeclared /
illegal work
Sanctions  The offence of taking recourse to
bogus subcontracting is punishable
by two years imprisonment and a
fine of €30,000
 Taking recourse to trafficking
through another is punishable by
one year of imprisonment and a
fine of €12,000
Temporary closure of temporary
work agency may be ordered by
Court for a period of up to two
months
 Recourse to illegal or undeclared
work is punishable with three years
of imprisonment and a fine of
€45,000 
 For specific categories, additional
penal and administrative sanctions
apply
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
/workers
rights
 Workers can directly sue the
contracting party of their employer,
or leave this to the trade unions
 Trade unions may start law suit
themselves on behalf of or for the
benefit of the worker unless the
worker opposes this action within
two weeks after notification of the
trade union’s intentions
No  In case of termination of the
undeclared worker’s contract of
employment, they are entitled to a
lump sum equivalent to six months
of salary
 Illegal foreign workers are entitled
to their wages for the time they
have worked irregularly and to a
lump sum equivalent to one month
of salary
 Trade unions may exercise foreign
workers’ rights, unless the worker
is explicitly opposed to it
Actors
involved
 Employees and their
representatives
 Employer, client or principal
contractor and their representatives
 Judges
 Social security collecting
authorities
 Employees and their
representatives
 User company and temporary work
agency
 Judges
 Social security collecting
authorities
 National Commission for the fight
against fraud (DNLF) 
 Interministerial delegation for the
fight against fraud
 Several inspectorates
 Concerning the declaration of
posted workers, bilaterally agreed
cooperation with authorities of
some other Member States
 Social partners
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Germany
Regulation Liability provisions for tax
obligations in construction 
Liability provision for social
security contributions
Liability provision for minimum
wages, holiday payments and
social funds payments
Nature of the
liability
No real chain liability but only in
relation to the contracting partner –
in other words, contractual liability –
irrespective of whether the parties
are part of, and on which level they
are part of, a subcontracting chain 
The recipient of the service is not
liable if the provider has shown an
exemption certificate the legitimacy
of which can be trusted
Joint and several liability under
certain conditions, such as when the
transaction aims to circumvent the
law, and only from a total value of
building services of €500,000 or
more
A special liability regime exists for
user companies of temporary work
agencies
Unconditional chain liability, that is,
joint and several liability. Hence, no
need arises to first sue and try
execution of rights against the direct
contracting party
Objectives Preventing distortions of competition
through undeclared work and
securing tax payments, including by
foreign service providers
Combating undeclared work,
including in relation to foreign
service providers
Improving the carefulness of
principal contractors when choosing
their subcontractors, protecting
German SMEs against unfair
competition by subcontractors from
‘cheap-wage countries’ and
combating unemployment in
German labour market
Scope of
liability  
Tax on compensation for
construction work, including wage
tax 
Social security contributions, limited
to building contracts with a value
above €500,000
Minimum wages and social funds
payments, including holiday
payments
Personal
scope
 Recipients or clients of the
building work or service carried
out by the provider or contracting
party, in relation to the wage tax of
the provider’s employees 
 All workers employed by provider
 Inland Revenue
 Principal and, under certain
conditions, other contractors in the
subcontracting chain
 All workers employed by provider
 Competent health insurance
collecting agencies  
 Principal and other contractors in
the subcontracting chain except
private individuals, building
owners and administrative bodies
 Workers, including posted workers,
employed by the subcontractor
 Joint institution of social partners
regarding social funds and holiday
payments (ULAK)
Territorial
scope
Applies throughout the country; also
covers foreign contractors when
active in Germany
Applies throughout the country; also
covers foreign contractors or
agencies when active in Germany
Applies throughout the country; also
covers foreign contractors when
active in Germany 
Preventive
measures
Obligation to take due care:  
The recipient contractor may require
from the contracting partner a valid
exemption certificate. Moreover, the
recipient must verify whether it can
trust that the certificate is not
obtained by unfair means or false
statements 
If no certificate is submitted, the
recipient party has to withhold 15%
of the remuneration paid to the
provider and is responsible for the
tax withholding and transferring it to
Inland Revenue
Principal contractor may be
exempted from liability if it shows
to the competent authority proof of
the reliability of the contracting
party, for instance, by submitting
valid certificates of good payment
behaviour, contractual commitments
or own statements of the provider 
Principal contractor has an
information obligation at the request
of the competent authority
Obligation to take due care: 
The principal contractor should ask
for written confirmation from the
subcontractor that it and any other
subcontractors in the chain will
respect the terms and conditions of
employment in the sector’s generally
applicable collective agreement 
In case of irregularities, the principal
contractor is obliged to make further
investigations 
Specific rules arise regarding public
procurement
Several self-regulatory instruments
exist to limit liability, such as
retaining the remuneration and
declarations from the workers
concerned as evidence that the
subcontractor has paid their wages
58
Liability in subcontracting processes in the European construction sector
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008
Germany (cont’d)
Regulation Liability provisions for tax
obligations in construction 
Liability provision for social
security contributions
Liability provision for minimum
wages, holiday payments and
social funds payments
Sanctions The recipient party is liable for
arrears of withholding taxes. This is
seen as an administrative offence
incurring a fine of up to €25,000
Recipient is liable for social security
debts of the provider as
subcontractor or temporary work
agency, and also for delay
surcharges and interest 
 Principal contractor and any
intermediary contractor above the
defaulting subcontractor in the
chain are jointly liable for back
payments to the workers concerned
and/or to the ULAK
 Penal sanction in case of negligent
ignorance of the principal
contractor or client
 Administrative fine of up to
€500,000 for ignoring obligation to
take due care
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
No No, but the worker may inform the
competent authority about the non-
payment of social security
contributions by their employer
 The workers can sue directly the
principal contractor or other
contractors above the employer in
the chain 
 Trade unions and German labour
court may provide legal aid or
assistance
 Work council of principal
contractor has the right to inform
workers of the subcontractor about
their rights 
Actors
involved
 Inland Revenue office with
competence for the service
recipient 
 Contracting parties
 Collecting agencies of the
competent health insurance
 Cooperation with other authorities
to combat undeclared work 
 Contractors
 Workers and their representatives
 Joint institution of social partners
(ULAK)
 Work council of principal
contractor
 Principal and subcontractors in the
chain
 Labour Court
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Italy
Regulation Liability Acts/decrees Tripartite regulation of contribution payment 
Nature of the
liability
Liability in contracting and subcontracting arrangements Single Insurance Contribution Payment Certificate
(DURC); mandatory in construction 
Objectives Safeguarding workers’ rights and free competition
between companies, ensuring transparency of the labour
market and combating abuse of posted workers in the
context of cross-border subcontracting
Enhancing the effectiveness of the legal liability
framework in practice
Scope of
liability 
 Wage tax (only regarding subcontracts)
 Social security contributions
 Wages
 Holiday payments
 Social fund payments
 Injuries
Contributions for holiday payments, pensions and health
insurance against occupational accidents in the
construction sector
Personal
scope
 Client
 Contractor is jointly and severally liable, together with
the subcontractor, with regard to the employees of the
subcontractor
Principal contractors 
Territorial
scope
Applies throughout the country and activities abroad
pursuant to Italian jurisdiction; also covers foreign
contractors or agencies active in Italy
Registration applies nationwide 
Preventive
measures
It is up to the client to complete all the operations and
implement all the verifications necessary to avoid being
involved in the effects of joint and several liability and
thus having to sustain high economic costs. This applies
even in the case of the preparation, drafting and signing
of contracting or subcontracting agreements
In public contracting arrangements, the DURC is one of
the documents necessary for awarding the contract.
Companies that are unable to furnish this certificate are
excluded from participating in public calls for tender
In construction, all contracting and subcontracting
construction companies are required to furnish a DURC
prior to commencement of any work subject to a
contract
Sanctions With the exception of the DURC in the construction
sector, no other penalties or sanctions aiming to expose
the failure to pay wages, social security contributions
and taxes by participants in the subcontracting chain
seem to have been legally regulated
An obligation exists to pay interest on arrears to the
Construction Workers’ Fund, according to the provisions
of the CLA. Payment of administrative sanctions and
interest is also required in respect of the additional
provisions of the various social security and national
insurance authorities
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
The subcontractor’s employees can take action against
the contractor and client, independently of the
relationship between the subcontractor(s) and client. It is
obligatory to attempt reconciliation at the Provincial
Labour Office prior to commencing legal action
-
Actors
involved
 Labour inspectorate 
 Inland Revenue
 Social security authorities
 Joint social fund
 National Social Security Institute 
 National Insurance Institute for Industrial Accidents 
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Netherlands
Regulation Wages and Salaries Tax and Social Security
Contributions Act 
38
Generally applicable collective labour agreement for
the construction industry (CLA)
Nature of the
liability
Joint and several liability, that is, chain liability No real liability, but only a social clause
Objectives Combating unreliable temporary work agencies and
subcontractors, the abuse of legal persons and unfair
competition
Extending compliance to the correct wage levels and
other labour conditions as stipulated in the CLA
Scope of
liability 
 Wage tax 
 Social security contributions
All material obligations deriving from the CLA, such as
wages and paid holidays
Personal
scope
 Subcontracting: (principal) contractor 
 Temporary work: user company 
 Subcontracting: principal contractors in construction
sector (‘employer’)
 Temporary work: user companies in construction
sector (‘employer’)
Territorial
scope
 Applies partly to foreign (sub)contractors or temporary
work agencies when active in the Netherlands, but
only when Dutch social security or tax law applies to
the foreign or Dutch employees involved
 Rules may also apply when the work is carried out
abroad by Dutch subcontractors
Generally applicable, which means that it must be
observed by all undertakings employing workers in the
Netherlands in the construction sector. This includes
foreign employers that, with their own employees, carry
out work in the Netherlands 
Preventive
measures
No legal obligations, but several self-regulatory
instruments for the user companies and contractors:
 screening of the supplier or (sub)contractor 
 use of a guarantee account (G-account) or direct
payment into an account of the Inland Revenue
(deposit)
 selection of an accredited temporary work agency 
 Employer is obliged to monitor compliance of the
CLA provisions in all individual employment contracts
covered by the agreement 
 Employer may only contract subcontractors on
condition that they apply the CLA provisions to their
employees
Sanctions  No fines
 Transfers from one G-account to another which are not
based on any subcontracting or hiring of workers must
be refunded by the receiving G-account holder
 In case of abuse, the Inland Revenue can withdraw the
G-account or deposit of the (sub)contractor or
temporary work agency
 No sanctions are stated in case of non-compliance by
the principal contractor 
 Employee of the subcontractor may start judicial
proceedings; it is uncertain if a claim against the
principal contractor can be based on the CLA
 In some situations, the user company might be held
liable through tort law 
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
No  Employee may start judicial proceedings; it is
uncertain whether a claim is possible on the basis of
the CLA social clause
 Trade unions may offer legal aid, represent the
employee, and/or start judicial proceedings in their
own interest as party to the CLA
 Employee may lodge complaint at the Labour
Inspectorate
Actors
involved
The Inland Revenue, as a public actor, is involved in the
application and practical implementation of the rules,
assisted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment, acting as the Directorate for the Labour
Market
 No supervising authorities involved
 Trade unions are entitled to defend the individual
rights of the employees of the subcontractors, as well
as to start judicial proceedings on the basis of their
own capacity as CLA parties
38
The provisions are laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Collection of State Taxes Act 1990.
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Spain
Regulation Workers’ Statute Law  on subcontracting in
construction industry
General tax law
Nature of the
liability
 Subcontracting: joint and several
liability; chain liability 
 Temporary employment: subsidiary
liability, which becomes a joint
liability if certain provisions has
been infringed, such as the illegal
posting of workers
Joint and several liability; chain
liability; applies only to
subcontracting in the construction
sector 
Subsidiary liability 
Objectives General objectives are protecting workers and ensuring compliance with the regulations by all companies involved
in the subcontracting process. Furthermore, the Law on subcontracting in construction industry aims to improve
working conditions, reduce accidents, promote quality and solvency of companies in construction, and introduce a
mechanism of transparency on worksites – as a result of limiting the amount of subcontracting and increasing the
control of it
Scope of
liability 
 Wages
 Social security contributions
 Wages
 Social security contributions
Tax debt regarding workers of
subcontractor
Personal
scope
 Principal contractor, but only if the
subcontracted work falls within the
scope of the principal’s ‘own
activity’
 Developer if acting in the capacity
of a contractor 
 User company 
(Principal) contractor must monitor
compliance with its provisions by
the subcontracted companies or self-
employed persons
(Principal) contractors which
(sub)contract works or services,
falling within the scope of their
principal economic activity
Territorial
scope
 Also covers foreign contractors and temporary work agencies when active in Spain, but only when Spanish social
security or tax law applies to the foreign and Spanish employees involved
 Principal contractors and user companies established in Spain have the same obligations towards posted workers
as towards domestic workers, according to Law 45/1995 on the posting of workers
Preventive
measures
 Temporary employment is not
allowed for work particularly
hazardous to health and safety, so
most of the construction work is
excluded
 Social security contributions: the
contractor requests a tax clearance
certificate; it is common practice
for the contractor to certify
compliance with obligations on a
monthly basis 
 Wages: no legal mechanism; it is
common practice for the contractor
to carry out regular compliance
checks on subcontractors 
 Monitoring and surveillance
obligations: certification of
adequate training and organisation
in the area of occupational risk
prevention, issued by the Register
of Accredited Companies
 No more than three vertical levels
in the chain
No liability if the (sub)contractor
provides the payer with a clearance
certificate issued by the relevant tax
authorities during the 12 months
preceding payment of each invoice 
Sanctions  Financial penalties (fines) 
 Wages: if, after a formal request,
payment is not forthcoming,
workers may take legal action
jointly against their own company
and the corresponding contractor
 Temporary employment: in case of
illegal posting of workers, the
transferred workers are entitled to
demand permanent employment
with either company
 Financial penalties (fines)
 Wages: see left column 
 According to the 4th General
collective agreement for the
construction sector, non-wage
compensation in the event of death
or serious forms of disability
resulting from an occupational
accident or illness
Financial penalties (fines) 
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Spain (cont’d)
Regulation Workers’ Statute Law  on subcontracting in
construction industry
General tax law
Complaint
mechanism
for workers
/workers
rights
 Works Council is entitled to monitor compliance with labour and social
security regulations, and to lodge complaints through legal channels with
the employer and the competent bodies or courts
 Extrajudicial settlement of disputes, managed by the autonomous
Communities competent to deal with cases of joint liability
-
Actors
involved
 Labour and Social Security Inspectorate
 Complaints can be communicated to the social partners 
 Through the Works Council, the trade unions are entitled to monitor
working conditions
 Penalty decisions are taken by the administration or court order
 Public administration
 Penalty decisions are taken by the
administration or court order
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